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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I introduce an institutional approach for the research of the Chinese
welfare state and the measure of people’s welfare benefit. I demonstrate that multiple
institutional transitions due to the economic reforms initiated in the early 1980s have
since dramatically changed the Chinese welfare state and the way welfare benefits are
distributed. Multiple institutional transitions discussed in this dissertation are structural
changes associated with the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms, the rapid
industrialization, ever-growing urbanization, and large-scale decentralization of the fiscal
system. Through the exploration of the data from the 1988 and 1995 Chinese Household
Income Project (CHIP), I found that SOE reforms and the fiscal decentralization played a
significant role in the cutback of welfare benefit in the reform era. Employees in nonstate sectors and drawing welfare benefits from local welfare funds are more likely to
receive less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than those people employed
in the state sector and drawing welfare benefits from state funds. The other two
institutional changes, namely industrialization and urbanization, are not statistically
significant.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

This is a study about institutional change and the Chinese welfare state. By
‘institutional change’ I mean China’s transitions from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy, from a socialist system to a mixed entity of socialism and capitalism,
and from a traditional society to a modern industrial society. By ‘the Chinese welfare
state’ I am not referring to a welfare state such as those found in western nations, but
rather the system in place in China which provides both social security and social relief in
various forms to Chinese citizens. A widely accepted proposition about the Chinese
welfare state is that the market transition initiated in the early 1980s has changed the way
Chinese people receive their welfare benefits (Wong 1992, Liu 2002). The purpose of my
dissertation is to examine China’s welfare system in the context of transition since the
Communist takeover in 1949. My preliminary study indicates that the research of market
transition and economic performance is an effective way of understanding the nature of
the Chinese social policy (Li 2004). As Douglass North (1994) proposed, economic
performance can be better understood by considering institutional change over time. The
role of institutions and institutional change has received extensive attention in the study
of the welfare state (Ashford 1987:1-29). For example, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990: 15) points out that the ideal method for studying the welfare state is interpreting
institutional settings in a particular state. The effort of examining the Chinese welfare
state in the context of transition has the potential of shedding new light on the affects of
its social implications.
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1. China’s Multiple Transitions and Welfare
China has undergone three simultaneous transitions since the establishment of the
Communist regime in 1949. In the past few decades, these transitions have radically
altered China’s welfare state policies which in turn have affected people’s well-being
enormously. The theory of multi-transitions is useful in explaining the dynamic
characteristics of Chinese society. The first transition in this theory is social transition.
Upon assuming power in China, the Communist regime abandoned many traditional
Chinese values and replaced them with the socialist ideology. This socialist ideology
originally borrowed from the former Soviet Union then mixed with traditional Chinese
values and Western welfare state principles in the economic reform era in the 1980s. The
second transition is institutional. As the centrally planned economy has been gradually
replaced by a market economy, the Chinese polity has become more fragmented. Local
governments and the civil society have gained more freedom from the central authority.
The third transition is the market or economic transition. The private sector has
proliferated due to the policy of building a market-oriented economy. Free-market
mechanisms continue to play an increasing role in pricing, resource distribution, and
economic development.
In this dissertation, the Chinese welfare state will be discussed in the context of
China’s multi-transitions. The above-mentioned transitions are obvious when we divide
the Chinese industrial and economic development into pre-reform and reform phases with
the imposition of the market mechanism in the early 1980s as the partition. Three major
stages are enclosed in the pre-reform phase. The socialist transformation started
immediately after the establishment of Communist China in 1949 and ended in 1956
2

when the Chinese government claimed that the socialist economic system had
rudimentally been established. In the second stage, from 1957 to 1965, China stepped
into the socialist construction and consolidation period during which the socialist
economy witnessed industrial stagnation and decreased agricultural output due to the
Great Leap Forward (GLF). The third stage comprises the Great Proletarian Culture
Revolution (GPCR) years from 1966 to 1976 and the recovering years immediate after its
termination. The reform phase began in 1980 as China began the installation of a market
economy. This phase can also be partitioned into three stages. The first stage includes the
initiative years of the rural reform from 1980 to 1984. Many policies aimed at
encouraging people’s productivity and institutional flexibility were introduced in this
stage. Among these policies, the most significant institutional innovation was the
introduction of the Household Productive Responsibility System (HPRS) and the market
mechanism.
The second stage started in 1984 and roughly ended in 1997. The market reform
initiated in rural areas was extended into urban areas and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
The market mechanism was widely applied in commercial and industrial sectors. Price
reforms were completed in the early 1990s. At this time the two-tier price system
practiced in the 1980s was revoked. Managers in SOEs received more autonomy in
determining production levels and pricing. In return they were also given full
responsibility for making profits and providing benefits to employees. Governments at
every level were required to undertake market transitions in their respective districts. In
1987 the Contract Responsibility System (CRS) was introduced to all SOEs. Under this
system, the market force replaced the administrative command in managing personnel of
3

SOEs. The third stage started in 1997 as the Chinese government loosened the ownership
regulation of SOEs. General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced in a report on the
Fifteenth Communist Party Congress that SOEs should be restructured through
shareholding reform which would allow the privatization of state property.
In the pre-reform phase, China’s first social security program the Labor Insurance
Regulations (LIRs) was introduced in 1951 (Liu 2002). Urban residents, mostly
employees in state sectors and government officials, were covered by comprehensive
social security schemes. Welfare benefits provided through the LIR included old-age and
disability pensions, health care and medical insurance, industrial injury insurance,
sickness benefits, and maternity benefits for female employees. Employees in non-state
sectors and self-employed urban residents were not covered by the LIRs. Urban selfemployed people were given social relief and a variety of allowances. In rural areas,
every rural household was assigned a piece of land. Rural people were eligible for
receiving collective welfare benefits provided by local governments or communal
organizations (Chan and Chow 1992). China’s welfare provision in this period was
generous and comprehensive. The exclusion of unemployment benefits was probably the
most significant character that differentiated the Chinese welfare state with established
Western welfare states. Employees in state enterprises and public organizations were
covered by pensions and health insurances. The costs of these schemes were completely
shouldered by the state and SOEs since according to the socialism ideology workers are
masters of the state (Dixon 1981, Chan 1992). Full employment was guaranteed for urban
working-age population. Workers in private or collective enterprises were also entitled to
access to comprehensive social welfare benefits with the cost completely borne by
4

employers. Rural people enrolled in People’s Communes were given access to basic
health care with the costs paid by the Commune or the respective collective organization.
Rural residents with disabilities were put under the care of collective organizations. The
Five Guarantees system stipulated that aged, disabled, and minors meeting certain
conditions in rural areas could enjoy “five guarantees” including food, clothing, housing,
Medicare, and burial expenses (and also stipulated compulsory education for minors).
In the reform phase, however, many urban working-age people were laid off due
to ownership changes and state enterprise reforms. As a result, many work-based welfare
benefits were cut off because their work units were unable to continue the payment of the
premium. Rural people were deprived of welfare benefits installed since the early 1950s.
Due to the collapse of the People’s Commune, almost all rural residents were denied
access to collective welfare. Welfare benefits of both urban and rural residents have been
shrinking compared to those of pre-reform periods. Since the late 1990s, the new
generation of the Chinese leaders has become aware of the social security program’s
insufficiency. The building of a new social security program is now a major concern for
the top bureaucrats. The latest slogan of the Chinese reform-minded leaders is to
construct a harmonious society in which the social security program plays a crucial role.
In recent years, welfare benefits have gradually been restored for urban residents. A
western welfare state in the institutional sense is emerging in Chinese society.
This dissertation will examine China’s effort of rebuilding its welfare system
which in the past two decades has been almost completely destroyed due to the economic
transition (Chen 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003, Wong 1998: 7, World Bank 2005). Studies
indicate that during the market transition Chinese leaders have been too concerned with
5

economic growth while ignoring the growing social problems (Rawski 1995, Wong and
Lee 2001). Recent nationwide crises such as the outburst of the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS), massive appealing activities of floating peasant workers (mingong),
and demonstrations of the state enterprises’ laid-off workers have testified that economic
growth alone cannot empower the Communist regime (O’Brien and Li 1995, Li and
O’Brien 1996, Cai 2002). The declining investment in social welfare and social security
has intensified the widening social gaps. The isolation of the ruling party from the masses
has generated panic among the Chinese leaders. They believe that current social tensions
might be countervailed by bringing the welfare state plans to the top of the national
agenda.

2. The Research Purposes and Possible Findings
In this study, the definition of the Chinese welfare state is much more general.
Chinese society has been in the middle of a series of transformations since the market
reforms were launched in the early 1980s. Social provisions in the pre-reform and the
reform eras are widely divergent. Typical welfare programs in Chinese society include
measures of both the welfare state I (welfare as social rights based on the citizenship) and
the welfare state II (welfare as benefits to the deserved social groups, usually meanstested). The Chinese welfare state is now a mixed entity with a socialist ideology ceding
its dominancy to the Western welfare state which is institutionally more suitable to the
current market-oriented economic regime.
Welfare programs to be discussed in this dissertation are schemes of social
security and social relief. China’s social security schemes include primarily old-age
6

pensions and health care insurances and services received by urban residents. These are
the major social security schemes which construct the core of the Chinese welfare state.
Esping-Andersen (1990: 79-80) argued that the analysis of pension provides a good
account of the welfare state. However, most Chinese rural residents do not have a
pension. The study of health care plans, therefore, will explain the welfare situation of the
rural population. Housing is another major welfare program prevailed in urban areas. It
will also be discussed in this study. Health insurance schemes and services usually
enclose more population than pension schemes do. Social security schemes receive the
lion share of the government expenditure. However conspicuous the social security
schemes might be in consuming the government revenue, means-tested and poor-relief
programs are not to be ignored. Social relief programs in Chinese society include
remedial schemes for the poor or handicapped, and welfare services for needy citizens.
Welfare services, as Chan and Chow (1992: 32-33) point out, are provided by the Civil
Affairs Department (CAD) and some other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Rural residents are usually the main receivers of social relief allowances.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impacts of China’s multi-transitions
on its welfare state. Historical review and analysis of the government expenditure on a
variety of welfare programs will be presented. Empirical evidences from surveys are used
to support findings from the documentary reviewing and analyzing. Targeted welfare
schemes are the social security (pensions, health care, etc.), work-related allowances and
subsidies, and social relief programs. The social relief spending Chinese society is the
means-tested social allowance for needy people. Since the coverage of social security
schemes is mostly work-based and exclusively available to urban residents, social relief
7

programs bear the responsibility of obliging disadvantaged social groups who rarely
receive any occupational benefits. Social security and social relief schemes serve the
interests of different social groups and therefore are designed to meet various social
missions. A decent discussion of the Chinese welfare state is impossible without
addressing both of them. Work-related allowances and subsidies are important welfare
benefits available exclusively to urban population. These benefits include housing
allowances, medical subsidies, child care subsidies, and regional subsidies for people
working in economic backward or under hazardous environment.
I argue in this dissertation that institutional changes associated with economic
growth are a crucial factor in predicting the outcomes of China’s welfare policies. The
Chinese welfare state can be best understood by investigating the pattern of social and
economic transitions. China’s centrally planned economy has experienced market and
institutional transitions. During these transitions, many welfare state programs organized
or sponsored by the government are gradually abandoned or reduced due to financial
insufficiency or organizational failure. These transitions are both unique and complex and
the effort of building a welfare state has become a most recent political goal of the
governing authority. In a speech recently made by Hu Jintao, current President of the
People’s Republic of China, the country’s new political goal was to construct a
harmonious society (People’s Daily Oct. 20 2006). In 2004 the government amended its
nationwide pension program to cover urban employees in private sectors. The
unemployment insurance schemes used to cover exclusively employees in state-owned
and collective enterprises extended their coverage to self-employed urban citizens. Since
1998, health insurance schemes have begun to enclose both urban and rural residents who
8

lost their health care benefits during the market transitions. Social relief programs have
begun to provide services and cash benefits to poor and handicapped. People who are
aged, unemployed, sick, or handicapped are now given the access to welfare schemes
financed by the government. These policy changes are a visible part of the recent agenda
of rebuilding the welfare state proposed by the new generation of Chinese leaders.
On a more general basis, my study is relevant to the academic debates on postCommunist or transitional societies. This study will contribute a new perspective and
fresh approach to the research of post-Communist or transitional societies. The neoclassic
approach has been condemned for placing too much emphasis on marketization or
privatization. Radical transitions—the so-called “shock-therapy” or “cold-turkey”
approach—observed in Center and Eastern Europe have never taken place in China. This
approach is thus inadequate when dealing with China’s transitions. In this dissertation I
will take a neo-institutional approach. Neo-institutionalists advocate that the changing
property regime and the economic development strategies differentiate China from other
post-Communist regimes. I extend my research to review China’s historical, cultural, and
ideological legacies, and examine the impacts they have placed on China’s institutional
settings. I believe that studying China’s transitions is essential to the understanding of
China’s social policies. This leads us to discover the nature of the Chinese welfare state.
This dissertation, therefore, has the potential of shedding new light on the study of the
welfare state in post-Communist or transitional societies.

9

3. Research Methods and Data Sources
I conduct this dissertation by designing a comprehensive research model based
primarily on statistical methods. The core statistical method used in this dissertation is the
ordinary least squares method (OLS) developed in Chapter V. The OLS analysis is a
method for linear regression that determines the values of unknown quantities in a
statistical model by minimizing the sum of the residuals squared. This method was first
developed by Carl Friedrich Gauss. I briefly introduce in the following section the
mathematic measures that support the regression models.
The data points are expressed in the following formula with y referring the
dependent variable and x referring the independent variables.
(yi, x1i, x2i, ….., xki) with i = 1, 2, 3, ….., n; k > 2
I model this data with a function of the form y = f (x1i, x2i, ….., xki, a), i = 1, 2,
…., n, where x is the independent variables while a is the model adjustable parameters. I
wish to find the a values such that the model best fits the data. In the OLS analysis, the
objective is to minimize the following function
n

S = ∑ ( yi − f ( x1i , x2i ,..., xki , a))

Equation 1.1

i =1

In multiple regression analysis, one replaces the relation f (x1i, x2i, ….., xki, a) ≈ yi
with f (x1i, x2i, ….., xki, a) = yi + εi
The regression model is thus expressed as
yi = α + β1 x1 + β 2 x2 + ... + β k xk + ε i (i =1, 2, …., n; k> 2)
The model can then be written as

10

Equation 1.2

⎡ y1 ⎤ ⎛⎜ ⎡1
⎢ y ⎥ ⎜ ⎢1
⎢ 2⎥ ⎜⎢
⎢ . ⎥ = ⎜ ⎢.
⎢ . ⎥ ⎜ ⎢.
⎢ y ⎥ ⎜⎢
⎣ i ⎦ ⎜⎝ ⎢⎣1

x11 ⎤ ⎡1
x21 ⎥⎥ ⎢⎢1
. ⎥ + ⎢.
⎥ ⎢
. ⎥ ⎢.
xn1 ⎥⎦ ⎢⎣1

x12 ⎤
⎡1
⎢
⎥
x22 ⎥
⎢1
. ⎥ + ... + ⎢.
⎢
⎥
. ⎥
⎢.
⎢1
xn 2 ⎥⎦
⎣

x1k ⎤ ⎞
⎡ε 1 ⎤
⎥⎟
⎢ε ⎥
x2 k ⎥ ⎟
2
⎡α ⎤ ⎢ ⎥
⎟
. ⎥ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥ + ⎢. ⎥
⎥ β
⎢ ⎥
. ⎥ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢. ⎥
⎟
⎢ε n ⎥
xnk ⎥⎦ ⎟⎠
⎣ ⎦

Equation 1.3

This regression assumes a linear relationship among the dependent variable,
independent variables, and control variables. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used
to uncover the main and joint effects of categorical independent variables and control
variables. A ‘main effect’ is the direct effect of an independent variable on the dependent
variable. A ‘joint effect’ is the effects placed on the dependent variable by two or more
independent variables when examined in one model. The ANOVA can minimize biases
created by correlation and test the problems of collinearity.
The regression analysis developed throughout this dissertation leads to the
discovery of the impacts that institutional changes have placed on the Chinese welfare
state and people’s well-being. Descriptive analysis methods are also used to examining
data drawn from the China Statistical Yearbook 1990, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005.
The China Statistical Yearbook (CSYB) is an annual statistical publication which
covers very comprehensive data and some selective data series in historically important
years. It provides data with rich statistics on people, economy, resources, markets,
industries, geographic areas and much more. For example, chapters like population,
investment in fixed assets, government finance, price index, people’s livelihood,
domestic trade, industry, foreign trade and economic cooperation, and culture, sports, and
public health will be used to compile my dataset.
Another statistical source is the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (CLSYB). The
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CLSYB is an annual statistical publication which comprehensively reports the labor
economic situation. It covers some main indicators series for historically years at national
and provincial, autonomous regional and municipal levels and parts of cities and special
administrative regions.
The third statistical source is the China Sanitation (Public Health) Statistical
Yearbook (CSSYB). The CSSYB provides statistical data of population, public health,
sanitation organizations, medical organizations, non-profit health organizations,
hospitals, communal health centers and much more.
The regression analyses and the models developed in Chapter V are based on two
survey data sources. The first one is the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP
1988). This collection consists of two distinct samples of the urban and rural population
of the PRC which were selected from significantly large samples (67,186 rural
households and 34,945 urban households). The second survey data, also a more important
one, is the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 1995). This collection
consists of both urban and rural survey results. Approximately 65,000 rural households
and 35,000 urban households are drawn by the State Statistical Bureau.
Within each survey dataset, there are separate individual and household data. The
rural component of this collection consists of two datasets, one in which the individual is
the unit of analysis and a second in which the household is the unit of analysis.
Correspondingly, the urban component also consists of two separate datasets, one for
individuals and another one for households.
The descriptive analyses of this dissertation use both individual and household
data. However, the regression analyses and the models developed in Chapter V are
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completely based on urban individual data from CHIP 1995.
There are some other data sources used in this dissertation. These data are
obtained from public libraries or through providers’ websites. They are public data
sources frequently used by many political science researchers. World Health
Organization (WHO) Member Countries Data includes data from World Health Statistics
and The World Health Report on diseases and health achievement for all WHO member
states. World Bank Development Indicator (WDI) is the World Bank's premier annual
compilation of data about development. It has been published annually in print and on
CD-ROM. The data used in this dissertation are from World Bank’s 2001, 2003, and
2004 collections on CD-ROM.

4. Chapter Outlines

Four chapters follow this introduction. In Chapter II I review the evolution of
Western welfare states and the welfare state theories. Definitions of the welfare state are
discussed and evaluated. Theories of the welfare state are reviewed in terms of their
relevance to this dissertation. Historical, ideological, and institutional perspectives of the
Chinese welfare state are summarized. The role of the state in the development of welfare
state is articulated. Literature on the Chinese welfare state indicates that the government
played an active role in steering businesses into a market economy. After a comparison of
the Chinese welfare state and Western welfare states, the research purposes of this
dissertation are further articulated.
Chapter III reviews traditional welfare schemes in pre-republic China. I also
discuss the fundamental philosophies and cultures underlying the ancient China’s welfare
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programs. This chapter articulates Communist China’s welfare programs in both urban
and rural areas. After a brief review of the evolution of China’s welfare system, I further
discuss the comprehensiveness of the welfare schemes. The historical legacies and
political impetuses leading to China’s established welfare system are given. The financial
burdens and institutional fails that finally ruined this comprehensive welfare system are
discussed. A deliberate comparison of the welfare system in the pre-reform and reform
eras was given in support of the argument that economic reforms in practice since the
early 1980s have profoundly changed the Chinese welfare state.
In Chapter IV I demonstrate the impacts that institutional changes have placed on
the Chinese welfare state. The Chinese government has played an active role in economic
development as well as the welfare provision. I discuss the general factors that have
steered the Chinese welfare state. These general factors are products of the economic
reforms transforming SOEs in urban areas and People’s Communes in rural areas.
Specific factors propelling China’s transitions are discussed in detail. The economic
reforms have brought multiple institutional changes into China. Institutional changes as
specific factors examined in this dissertation are SOE reforms, the rapid industrialization
and urbanization of the Chinese state, and the fiscal decentralization in the reform era.
These institutional changes have influenced the way people receive welfare benefits
differently.
In Chapter V I develop a comprehensive analytical method testing the impacts
that the institutional changes have placed on the Chinese welfare state and people’s
welfare benefits. Data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 and
1995 are used in support of my arguments. Results suggest that SOE reforms and the
14

fiscal decentralization have significant estimates while industrialization and urbanization
are statistically non-significant. This finding confirms the active state argument which
denies the claim that resource availability and state wealth have played a determinant role
in the transition of the Chinese welfare state. All models report negative relations
between the dependent variable Welfare Benefit and the institutional variables, namely
SOE Reform, Industrialization, Urbanization, and Decentralization. Therefore,
institutional changes undergoing in both economic and social fields have profoundly
influenced the well-being of Chinese people.
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CHAPTER 2: The Welfare State and Welfare State Theories

As a social science concept, the term ‘welfare state’ is both abstract and ambiguous.
There is no generally accepted definition of the welfare state (Titmuss 1963: 3, 1987:
141, Veit-Wilson 2000). According to Henry Pelling (1984: 88-90), ‘welfare state’ as a
term was first used by Alfred Zimmern in the late 1930s to distinguish between the
policies of the democracies and the war states of Europe’s dictators. With welfare states
gradually replacing old poor relief systems in the late 19th century, the poor laws 1 for
example, welfare provision in advanced industrial European countries became universal
(Marshall 1964, Ashford 1987: 10-12, Korpi 1989). Modern welfare states, Douglas E.
Ashford (1987: 4) argued, developed through a gradual process. Modern welfare states
differed from previous schemes of poor relief because welfare provisions in these states
were based on social rights (Burchell 1995, Cox 1998, Kahn 2002).

1. Western Welfare State Theories

In the pre-War era, the term welfare state was used to describe those states whose
governments offered “a basic modicum of welfare” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19). This
definition however, as Esping-Andersen (1990: 19) puts it, is misleading since it is based
solely on the expenditure aspect of the welfare state. Social scientists have been criticized
for being too prone to accepting any “nation’s self-proclaimed welfare-state status”
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 20). As this approach rarely looks at factors other than the level
1

Poor Laws are the regulations towards poor relief. The most noted poor law system was the social security
and welfare system in operation in England from the 16th century until the establishment of the Welfare
State in the 20th century. It was made up of several Acts of Parliament and subsequent Amendments.
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of social expenditure and commitments made by states, it is an inadequate avenue of
distinguishing between different types of welfare states. Many other aspects of the
welfare state are ignored by this definition. For example, a state may spend a significant
portion of its revenue on welfare but distributes most of it to particular social groups such
as privileged civil servants. As a result, many recent researchers would not define this
state as a welfare state (Veit-Wilson 2000).
Since the 1970s, scholars have emphasized the functional and structural aspect of
the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990: 20, Myles and Quadagno 2002). This approach,
as Esping-Andersen (1990: 35-47) argued, inherited the theoretical legacy of Adam
Smith and Karl Polanyi who stressed the de-comodification of workers in a market
economy. The contemporary definition of the welfare state enables researchers to explore
comparatively the nature of modern welfare states. Scholars following this definition
have related the welfare state to the goal of maintaining a minimum standard of life
(Wilensky 1975, Mishra 1990, Bryson 1992), relief of poverty (Walker 1983, Parry 1985,
Mishra 1990), full employment (Parry 1985, Mishra 1990), social and economic equality
and justice (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, Robertson 1988), deco modification (Fruniss
and Titon 1979, Esping-Andersen 1987), and the redistributive aspect of the market
system in welfare provision (Wilensky 1975, Esping-Andersen 1982, Walker 1983). At
the core of contemporary welfare states lies the doctrine of viewing social rights as
fundamental human rights (Marshall 1964, Wilensky 1975: 1, Esping-Andersen 1990).
The universality of modern social security schemes provides citizens with a safety net
which in turn ameliorates the pure commodity status of workers (Kahn 2002).
With the welfare state playing an ever-increasing role in people’s lives, scholars
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examining are now raising theories from different angles. One important perspective of
the welfare state is that theories intending to explain it do not have a distinguished
history. Studies about the welfare state have been undertaken primarily by political
scientists, sociologists, or economists (Therborn 1986: 132-133, Mishra 1987:69). British
sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1964) identified the welfare state as a
distinctive combination of democracy, welfare, and capitalism. The introduction of the
concept of social rights laid the ground for thereafter studies on welfare states (Korpi
1989). Welfare provision became an inalienable part of modern government activities.
Routine welfare schemes in modern welfare states include social insurance for
unemployment, sickness, injuries, and so on.
One earliest generation of welfare state studies was the ‘logic of industrialism’
approach. Industrialization theorists came up with the assertion that economic
development caused the modern welfare state. Typical ‘logic of industrialism’ theses
established the connection between rising welfare state expenditures and the economic
growth in developed countries (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Priyor
1968, Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 1975). It is not difficult for many to accept that
industrialization brought too much misery to the working class. As Karl Polanyi (1957
[1944]) demonstrated in The Great Transformation, poor laws could not shield workers
from the increasing commodifing pressure associated with the market economy.
Industrialization created the modern industrial economy which has destroyed traditional
values and social institutions (Flora and Alber 1981, Pryor 1968). For people
impoverished during industrialization, kinship and community became a less reliable
source of welfare. Therefore the State was anticipated to play a more active and expanded
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role in welfare provision (Kerr et al. 1960: 22, 152).
Whereas ‘the logic of industrialism’ theorists stressed the determining role of the
market force, Structuralist Marxists emphasized changing relations of production (Offe
1972, O’Connor 1973). The welfare state expansion, James O’Connor (1973) argued,
was driven by the capitalist mode of production. Structuralist Marxism and its ‘logic of
industrialism’ counterpart shared a similar functional logic (Giddens 1976: 716-22,
Gough 1979: 8-9). Welfare states, as both theories asserted, are the inevitable product of
larger market or economic forces beyond the control of policy makers or class directives
(Poulantzas 1973, Block 1977, Skocpol and Amenta 1986, Esping-Andersen 1990: 14,
Myles and Quadagno 2002). The emergence of the welfare state, according to the ‘logic
of industrialism,’ was the historical result of capitalist economic growth. Structuralist
Marxists resorted to the capitalist relations of production when interpreting the welfare
state. For both approaches, the impact of political actors and institutions other than
markets are not so relevant. Governments are therefore treated as empty-minded
institutions.
The institutional approach of interpreting the variation of the welfare state turned
into policy making and political activity. Walter Korpi (1980, 1983), for example,
stressed the claim of ‘politics matters’ in arguing the diversity of the welfare state. The
“power resource” theory gradually received scholars’ acceptance because the interaction
of capitalism and democracy was found to be crucial to the making of social policy.
Gerhardt Lenski (1966) argued that democratic polities provided an adequate arena for
the working class to unite against the elites (the ruling few). The State and government
were therefore utilized by the masses to construct a welfare state which allotted a large
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share of the social surplus to social security schemes. The ‘power resource’ theory also
stresses the importance of organization of the masses (the union), the mobilization of the
working class, and competitive elections. The relatively generous spending in some states
could be explained by the relative success of left-wing parties in their governments
(Korpi 1989, Palme 1990, Kangas 1991). Empirical evidence confirmed to some degree
the ‘power resource’ theory when scholars designed quantitative methods to test it
(Cameron 1978, Stephens 1979, Castles 1982, Hicks and Swank 1984, Myles 1984,
Esping-Andersen 1985). Institutionalists also emphasized the organization and structure
of state institutions. Theda Skocpol (1992), for example, took a polity-centered approach
in examining the role of state institutions in the welfare state evolution. Institutional
settings like the veto points in policy making were believed to have contributed to the
variation of welfare states.
The emergence of welfare states has been a gradual phenomenon in developed
countries. As Esping-Andersen (1990) puts it, there is no such thing that one day every
one agrees that people need a welfare state. The gradually constructed welfare state is
both the product of economic growth and the result of institutional settings associated
with capitalism and democracy. Few will disagree that economic growth has laid the
ground for modern welfare states by enabling a relatively larger share of surplus to be
spent on social security schemes. Besides the ‘logic of industrialism’ argument, the
institutional approach has gained credibility simply because a state’s economic capability
cannot guarantee the welfare state. In other words, a state might possess the economic
power to spend on welfare but lack the will to do so. This is evident when we look at the
United States which has the most powerful economy in the world and weak welfare
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system. Therefore, as institutionalists argued, examining institutional settings can be an
adequate avenue of the study of welfare states.

2. The Chinese Welfare State: Traditional and Modern Perspectives

Traditional systems of relief for the poor prevailed throughout China’s long
dynastic history (Chow 1987). Before the Communist regime was established in 1949,
welfare provision in Chinese society was undertaken by the State in the form of poor
relief. Although Chinese emperors claimed to be the son of the Heaven and bore the
responsibility of taking care of their subjects, the State’s role in welfare provision was
actually very limited (Deng 1986: 226, Meng and Wang 1986: 276-284). Local
governments provided food and medicine to victims of nature calamity only occasionally.
Victims of floods, catastrophic nature disasters, or wars were given temporary tax breaks
as compensation. Social relief programs aimed at the poor or victims of nature calamity
were usually provided by local wealthy people (xiangshen). Non-government social
groups such as temples and churches also provided food and medicine to people in these
situations (Deng 1986: 203).
According to the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotung, the traditional social relief
system in China was primarily based on kinship networks (Fei 1985). The traditional
Chinese culture failed to develop the concept of social rights. Chinese traditional social
relations were based on five basic relationships (wuchang) which stressed an
interpersonal dependency. Many social relations in traditional China were therefore not
regulated by law but subject to intense human kindness or personal connection. The
family was the most important network for providing help in difficult times (Wong 1971,
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Chow 1987, Chan and Chow 1992: 37). The State or the emperor, on the other hand, was
perceived by the Chinese as a regulator rather than a protector. People are more prepared
to seek support from their relatives than turn to the State for help (Dixon 1982).
The modern Chinese welfare state has a short history when compared to Western
welfare states. Viewed as a Western idea, the modern welfare state did not come to be
known in China until the late 1970s when the Communist regime finally ended its
ideological purge. However, welfare provision by the State was not strange to Chinese
people well before the Western welfare state ideology was introduced. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) had declared before it took over state power that everyone
should be entitled the equal rights in political as well as in economic areas (Mok 1983,
Selden and You 1997). The CCP adopted a series of social policies aimed at constructing
an egalitarian society (Chan and Chow 1992: 9-20). In the early years of the Communist
regime, the CCP successfully removed the so-called “exploitive class” and redistributed
productive materials like land and farm cattle to poor people. In the 1950s, China began
to install a state welfare program (Selden and You 1997). During the inception years of
the social security schemes a work-based welfare system was established (Chow 1988).
Welfare benefits like free health care and generous old-age pensions became guaranteed
benefits to all state sector workers (Liu 2002). Chinese urban residents, particularly those
working in state-owned enterprises, were entitled to broad social rights in addition to
privileged political rights (Selden and You 1997).
However, since the economic reform era, the Chinese people have been gradually
deprived many work-based welfare benefits. According to the demarcation line drawn by
Nathan Glazer (1986), a welfare system providing its citizens with as-of-right services
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and benefits based on universal social rights is called Welfare I while the term Welfare II
is used to denote the means-tested and remedial system (Glazer 1986, Wong 1987: 2,
Esping-Andersen 1990: 20). Before the Chinese government announced its ambitious
social security programs in the late 1990s, many active Chinese welfare schemes could be
categorized into the residual model or the Welfare II (Chow 1987, Wong 1987: 7, Chen
1996). Since many people lost their work-based welfare benefits, in recent years the
budget allotted to social relief programs has been increased (Liu 2002). The current
Chinese welfare state is a mixed system with the residual model occupying an important
share (Mok 1987, Wong 1998). Although social security schemes like pension or
unemployment insurance are routine items received by some Chinese people, their
coverage up to date is very limited (Liu 2002). The Chinese government puts much effort
into social relief programs. The major responsibility assigned to the Ministry of Civil
Affairs, for example, is to help people overcome temporary hardships (Wong 1987: 1). It
is not surprising that the current Chinese welfare state is compatible to Western welfare
states in the 1970s. Welfare states of Western industrialized countries have developed
from a residual model to an institutional-redistributional model since the 1950s
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). Similarly, in the current Chinese welfare state welfare
provision is undertaking a transition from playing a supplementary role to being an
independent and inalienable part of the social system (Chow 1987). The range of social
welfare services and the coverage of social security schemes have extended to include a
wide variety of universal benefits designed to promote the well-being of all members of
society.
Literature shows that in China few scholars are interested in welfare matters
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(Wong 1987: 5). Two important factors impede the study of the Chinese welfare state.
First, the concept of the welfare state is ambiguous. It is well known that many
methodological tactics introduced in the study of Western welfare states have failed to
explain the Chinese case (Wong 1998). The reason is straightforward. China is neither a
capitalist system nor a democratic entity and therefore is not institutionally compatible to
Western countries. Second, when it comes to empirical tests, China’s statistical resources
are always suspect or fail to support any concrete conclusion. These two constraints
determine that studies of the Chinese welfare state are less popular or hard to undertake
(Wong 1998: 5).
The discussion of welfare policies has been the most prevalent topic in recent
years. Joyce K. Kallgren (1969) reported on the labor insurance scheme in its inception
years. Deborah Davis-Friedmann (1978) analyzed the “five guarantees” scheme and the
rural relief system. Research carried out by Deborah Davis (1988) reviewed the dramatic
change of China’s pension reform under the market economy transition. The philosophy
of the Chinese welfare state has also been a heated topic. John Dixon (1981) claimed that
eight ideological elements influenced welfare provision in China. 2 Cecilia L. W. Chan
(1992) pointed out that the current Chinese welfare philosophy is a mixture of traditional
values and socialist ideology. By comparing the Western and traditional Chinese ideas of
social welfare, Nelson W.S Chow (1987) demonstrated that China had a long history of
social welfare dating to the Zhou Dynasty. Raymond Kwok-hong Chan and Ming-sum
Tsui (1997) confirmed Chow’s assertion. In addition, they pointed out that in recent years
2

The eight ideological elements, as John Dixon (1981) specified and summarized by Cecilia L.W. Chan
(1992), are the Confucian welfare legacy; the proletarian work ethic; egalitarianism and social justice;
mutual aid and the collective spirit; the virtues of diligence, frugality and thrift; self-reliance; the
continuing class struggle; and the ‘mass line’.
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traditional Chinese welfare practices had been very much institutionalized into a Western
welfare state.
Studies of the Chinese welfare state have been heavily influenced by the
economic reform initiated in the late 1970s. Chan (1992) identified that the rapid
economic and social transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy destroyed the old socialist welfare system while the effort of developing a
Western welfare state remains to be seen. Cecilia L. W. Chan and Nelson W. S. Chow’s
More Welfare After Economic Reform? (1992) offers a longitudinal and theoretical
overview of the Chinese welfare state’s development in the economic reform era. Chan
and Chow reviewed major periods of China’s welfare development and transformation
and found that China “is actually using a mixed model in welfare delivery” (Chan and
Chow 1992: 134). Their survey results confirmed that the economic reform greatly
destroyed Chinese traditional values and that the residual model of the welfare state is
being replaced by a structural welfare system. 3
Most studies are more specific, focusing on the changes occurring in individual
welfare schemes, rather than attempting to cover the welfare system as a whole. Victor
W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel (1975) reviewed the Chinese health care service in the prereform era and found that the health of Chinese people had improved markedly since the
Communists came to power. Gordon G. Liu and his colleagues (2004) assessed China’s
recent efforts in restructuring its urban health insurance schemes. Martin Feldstein (2004)

3

A structural welfare system, as Chan and Chow (1992: 19) argued, is based on the ideological
commitment to political and economic equality to all. The CCP and the Chinese government provided
welfare benefits to Chinese citizens through work units, Street Offices and Residents’ Committees, local
Civil Affairs Departments, and many other channels.
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examined the social security pension reform in the late 1990s. Lessons from the reform of
China’s welfare schemes have been well discussed. Gerald Bloom and Gu Xingyuan
(1997) argued that the market reform in China’s health sector distorted health providers’
behavior and therefore jeopardized Chinese people’s health. Xingzhu Liu and Willian C.
L. Hsiao (1995) found that the market reform changed Chinese hospitals’ financing and
payment policies which in turn led to a rapid escalation in health care expenditures.
Recent studies have been more quantitative than ever in methodology. Chan and
Chow (1992) reported their survey results indicating that most Chinese citizens (93%)
prefer generous welfare provision by the State. H. Naci Mocan and his colleagues (2004)
investigated 6,407 Chinese urban households and found that the escalation of health care
costs contributed to the increasing inequality in access to medical care. John S. Akin et
al. (2003) conducted a longitudinal survey examining the changing characteristics of the
health insurance distribution in China in the period of 1989-1997. They found that quite
contrary to common assumptions, disparities in health insurance coverage between
different social groups actually declined during the market reform era. These quantitative
studies of the Chinese welfare state appear to be only in their infancy.

3. The Role of the State in Welfare State Studies

The role of the state in the emergence and establishment of welfare states has
been well documented. Based on how the role of state is considered, current literature on
welfare state expansion can be divided into two camps. One camp tends to overlook the
role of the state in the structuring and, more importantly, expansion of welfare state. This
approach stresses factors such as economic growth and demographic change rather than
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state intervention. The most influential work in this camp has been Harold Wilensky’s
(1975) The Welfare State and Equality, which emphasizes the determining role of
impersonal economic factors. The role of the state as described in this approach, therefore,
is passive since the state only responds to social needs and acts correspondingly. The
other camp values and emphasizes the state’s active role in the development of welfare
states which, apparently, have evolved in different ways. This has generally been
identified as the active state approach with Gosta Espoing-Andersen’s (1990) The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism as the most representative work. The active state approach
holds that political institutions and politics play the leading role in the development of
welfare. A strong state has its own agendas in developing welfare programs (Orloff and
Skocpol 1984). It does not necessarily respond to or act on social needs or forces. The
variations in welfare states, therefore, must be the results of the choices and actions of
states rather than merely independent economic and demographic factors.
The passive state thesis includes the first generation of welfare state studies,
typically the logic of industrialism theories. This approach has well documented the
common trajectory of rising welfare state expenditure throughout the developed world
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Pryor 1968, Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky
1975). The main arguments developed in this approach are well known. This approach
argues that rapid industrialization creates a demand for public welfare spending as
traditional social networks in agrarian societies are eroded and therefore rendered
incapable of supporting continuously impoverished urbanities (Kerr et al. 1960). Wage
workers gradually become a primary social body in industrial societies. Their
vulnerabilities, however, grow significantly when they get sick, old, or lose their laboring
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ability at any stage of their lives (Pampel and Weiss 1983). The logic of industrialism
thesis is also supported by empirical studies. For example, Wilensky (1975) claimed that
the root cause of the welfare state was the gap created by economic growth and
demographic change which, in return, resulted in rising life expectancy and aged
population.
The passive state approach stresses the economic perspective in evaluating the
expansion of welfare states (Aaron 1967, Musgrave 1969, Wilensky 1975, Wilensky et al.
1985). The economic perspective in welfare state studies is very straightforward. This
perspective claims that states are passive in establishing welfare programs as they simply
supply what is demanded by the public within the context of available resources. Jerald
Hage et al. (1989) conducted a time-series cross-sectional research on the correlation of
economic growth and welfare state expansion. Based on data from four industrialized
countries (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy), however, they found no evidence in
favor of the economic perspective argument. Hence, they ruled out state wealth or
availability of resources as the cause of escalating social expenditure. “At least for these
states (Britain et al.),” they claimed, “major decisions about public resource allocation
are made independently of the level of wealth available for the state.”(Hage et al. 1989:
256)
As for the active state approach, the most important piece of work is indisputably
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. He introduces a
series of variables such as power structure, institutional setting, and state-market
interaction that have been overlooked in the passive state approach. He also thoroughly
discusses welfare state regimes efforts of de-commodification and degrees of state
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intervention. He claims that the state should be placed in the center of welfare state
studies when it comes to differentiating welfare state regimes:
We have seen that market-based regimes, as in the United States, were made
possible by active and direct government policy; status privilege, of course, is
a legacy of corporatism and authoritarian etatism; and the universalist socialcitizenship model is clearly only possible where the state crowds out both
markets and corporatism. The state thus stands in the center of how we define
regime-types (Esping-Andersen 1990: 103).
Various studies have explored the role of states who are actively involved in the
expansion of welfare programs (Rimlinger 1971, Heclo 1974, Orloff and Skocpol 1984).
Bismark’s creation of an etatism welfare system is well known. Other examples are the
welfare legislation in the first Lloyd George government (Hay 1975) and Mussolini’s first
six years (Lipset 1960, Neufield 1961). According to Hage et al. (1989), welfare state
studies that regard the state as a responsive actor should all be labeled as using the
passive state approach. Thus the economic model which stresses the availability of
resources, the modernization model emphasizes political development (Lipset 1960), and
the interest group model (Weir et al. 1988, Skocpol 1992, Amenta 1998) or class
conflict/mobilization model (Huber et al. 1993, Hicks 1999) which emphasizes the role
of election and parties aggregating interests from below, should all be ruled out of the
active state approach (Hage et al. 1989). The reason is straightforward: all of these
models regard the state as a responder rather than an active actor with its own agendas
and strategies.
Hage et al., on the other hand, examine the active role of the state in a narrow
sense. The state, as they argue, is nothing more than a Marxist-Leninist governing body,
or the superstructure as a whole dealing mostly with issues of governance and rule. Hage
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et al. agree to some degree that the active state approach does not have to completely rule
out all players other than the state itself. They deliberately state that “[w]e do not feel that
the active sate thesis requires demonstrating that the state is also non-responsive to the
availability of resources or the extent of debate as reflected in modernization measures.”
(Hage et al. 1989: 24-5)
Thus state bureaucrats have emerged to the center of Hage et al.’s deliberation.
They have repeatedly enunciated that the state pursues its own strategies (Hage et al.
1989: 24-5). The responsible player that acts on behalf of the state, according to their
argument, is the state bureaucracy. This is a body of people who have developed
administrative skills through years of governing experience (Orloff and Skocpol 1984).
The state bureaucrats thus want to expand their domain. They also develop a particular
image of an advanced industrialized society and make it the goal of the country that they
are managing (Thomas and Meyer 1984, Ramirez and Boli 1987).
In sum, both the passive and active state approaches bring important points to
light in welfare state studies. While stressing different perspectives of the welfare state
and its expansion in history, these two theories provide valuable threads and inspirations
for this study of the Chinese welfare state to build upon. The passive state approach
regards the state as a responsive body in the process of welfare policy making. It testifies
that the growing revenue surplus, class conflict and mobilization, or institutional setting
or power structure of a particular type, have enabled and sometimes even forced the state
to act in certain ways. Thus, welfare state studies could be done through analyzing and
comparing differences in these areas across national borders. The active state approach,
in comparison, looks at the state’s direct and active role in the construction of welfare
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programs. It makes a perfect sense if noting that in a strong state such as China, the state
bureaucrats seize a huge amount of resources and possess both the administrative skills
and institutional ability to formulate a welfare state they can image. This is actually what
has happened in China, a country in which state bureaucrats have inarguably dominated
the policy making process.

4. The Active Role of the Chinese State in Welfare State Studies

Admitting the active role of the Chinese state will plot this dissertation in two
aspects. First, noting the active role of the Chinese state makes the indisputable
monopoly of the Chinese government less abrupt. The path-dependency theory claims
that institutions are self reinforcing (Collier and Collier 1991, Pierson 2000). In modern
societies, extensive policy arrangements fundamentally shape the incentives and
resources of political actors (Rose 1990). Therefore, policies and institutions once created
are usually remarkably durable. In the China’s case, a strong role of the state has been in
place since its first dynasty – the Qin Dynasty – was established in 221 B.C. The
dominant role of the government has since been well integrated into ordinary Chinese
people’s life.
Secondly, the Chinese state continues to play an active role in the reform era
albeit the market reforms introduced into Chinese society the demand-supply
mechanisms which have science competed with the state power. The market reforms
have since the early 1980s injected multiple institutional changes into China’s centrally
planned economic system. However, the transitions did not give the strong role of the
Chinese state a full brake. The Chinese state and its government continue to shape,
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although no longer monopoly, the policy making on economic development and welfare
provision.
It is noted that China’s leaders have borrowed much of their modern welfare
ideology from other socialist states, particularly the former Soviet Union (Chow 1988). It
is also well known that socialist states tend to spend more generously on welfare
programs than their capitalist counterparts. For example, Lukianenko (1978) examined
several socialist countries and found that even economically laggard countries such as
Cuba and Mongolia had instituted elaborate social security programs which indicated that
these countries regarded such provisions as essential features of their societies. The
reason, as argued by Lukianenko, is that the governments of the socialist states take an
active role in managing their welfare programs (Chow 1988). As quoted by Chow,
Lukianenko summarizes the socialist style of welfare state. He wrote:
They (socialist countries) take a direct share in making rules which define the
various forms of social security, fix their level and conditions of entitlement,
and governing their financing and administration; and they decide on the
award of benefits in cash and kind and other forms of social protection. (Chow
1988: 8)
The Chinese welfare state fits the active state model very well. First, the state
actively and directly involved in almost every field of welfare provision (Tang and Ngan
2001). For example, a comprehensive Labor Insurance Regulations (LIR) policy was
adopted by the Chinese government as early as 1951 when many advanced industrial
countries could not afford a full-fledged social security system. The installation of the
LIR was unprecedented, especially when considering the Communist government had
seized power less than two years earlier and the state’s economy was still in chaos
(Mackerras 1998, Tang and Ngan 2001).
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A strong political overtone prevails in the Chinese social welfare concept. By and
large, every welfare measure is installed in the name of serving socialism, and the welfare
state’s ultimate goal is to support socialist construction (Dixon 1981, 1982, Mok 1983,
Tang 1999). Socialist workers, as masters of the socialist state, are entitled to the most
privileged social welfare benefits (Mackerras 1998). These benefits provided by the 1951
LIR and the later on revised regulations have also included some special articles aimed at
improving workers’ livelihood. The fact that workers do not have to contribute towards
the social welfare program indicates that benefits are not work-related, but are forms of
state subsidies, or more specifically rewards based on their social status (Chow 1988).
Compared with rural people, urban residents receive more benefits and better coverage in
almost every welfare program. Model workers, particularly those who are directly
employed by the government in the military or in government service, and even veterans
receive preferential treatments.
Secondly, the passive state thesis which claims that the state is constrained by
available resources in welfare provision does not adequately explain the Chinese welfare
state in its infant years. As well discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese
government introduced a comprehensive and generous social security system that it could
barely sustain in the early 1950s (Walder 1986, Leung and Nann 1995, Shaw 1996). Not
only did the Chinese welfare provision surpass many developed industrialized countries,
its complexity and generosity also overtook some socialist states such as Cuba or Poland.
This is even more impressive when considering that the country was by and large an
agrarian society. Actually, the heavy financial burden it placed on the center government
and the failure of a workable administration finally disabled the 1951 LIR (Chow 1988).
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Many tempting welfare benefits such as longtime paid sickness leave, full compensation
for injured persons, and old-age pension were either revoked or disregarded due to the
financial shortage facing the central government.
Thirdly, the trajectory of the Chinese welfare state expansion does not conform to
the interest group model or the class conflict/mobilization model. Since its establishment,
the Communist government has announced in its political creed the ambitious plan of
eliminating the exploiting classes (landlord, capitalist, etc.). It states in the Preamble of
the 1982 Constitution that “[t]he exploiting classes….. have been eliminated in our
country.” Political settings in China do not allow much room for the maneuvering of
actors such as political parties, interest groups, or social classes that claim unique
interests. The winning coalition does exist in the Chinese politics. However, it has been
ruling-oriented rather than interest-sharing. The sort of coalition forming tendency in
policy-making arenas so characteristic in other countries has been absent in China’s
politics. For example, Article 1 of the 1954 Constitution states the country “is a socialist
state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on
the alliance of workers and peasants.”
Although the Constitution lays down the grounds for workers and peasants
participating in the national politics, it does not provide an adequate avenue for ordinary
people to voice their opinions, exert their constitutional rights, or participating in the
governing process. The institution equivalent to the parliaments found in most Western
countries is the National People’s Congress. Article 2 of the 1954 Constitution states that
“[a]ll power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people.” And people can
exercise state power through “the National People’s Congress and the local people’s
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congresses at different levels.” However, compared with the ruling party’s branches set at
different administrative levels, the people’s congresses have less power in legislation,
budget, and personnel. Not only have the people’s congresses been firmly controlled by
the party, they also have less authority than the administrative system. The people’s
governments can easily revoke personnel decisions made by the people’s congress at
their level. They can disregard the congress’s budget bills as well. For example, the
people’s governments at almost every level maintain an extra-budget which is totally out
of touch of the local congresses.

5. Conclusion

Due to the limited access to qualified data sources and the complexity of welfare
schemes, most studies avoid giving a general evaluation of the Chinese welfare state. In
addition, scholars have not reached a consensus on the definition or the adequate
methodology of conducting research of the Chinese welfare state. As a result, studies of
the Chinese welfare state have been quite inadequate. First, research efforts have been
mainly qualitative. Only in recent years have studies began to introduce quantitative
methods in the study of welfare matters (Wong 1998: 7). Second, very few systematic
level studies have been conducted. Most studies have been concentrated on individual
welfare perspectives or programs such as occupational welfare or the old-age pension
scheme. Third, Chinese welfare policies have changed radically since the economic
reform. Many studies fail to summarize these changes and evaluate their impacts on wellbeing of the Chinese people and instead devote excessive attention to historical and
ideological matters.
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Debates about the role of the state are far from being settled. It is quite reasonable
for active-role proponents to argue against the passive approach given modern welfare
states require the active involvement of the state in the design of a more redistributive
welfare system. In contrast, arguments in favor of the passive role of the state place more
emphasis on factors such as economic development, political change, and social
transitions associated with industrialization and urbanization. Studies on welfare states
have been conducted in both directions.
Previous research on the Chinese welfare state has focused exclusively on the
active role of the state. Current literature indicates that socialist states have been known
for generous welfare provision to workers. The CCP leaders, for a long time have been
under heave influences from leading socialist states, have taken welfare provision as a
critical sign of the superiority of socialism. Not only has the Chinese government laid the
ground for China’s comprehensive welfare system, but it has shouldered the funding and
daily operation of the major welfare programs, namely pensions, health insurance,
housing allowance, and unemployment compensation (after 1998) until the market
reforms were initiated in the early 1980s.
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CHAPTER 3: The Chinese Welfare State in Transition

In 2004, China’s State Council issued a white paper entitled “China’s Social Security and
Its Policy.” This was one of many recent efforts made by the Chinese government to
fulfill its vow of restoring its social security programs. In the white paper, China’s social
security is portrayed as an important socio-economic system which should be
correspondently invested in to facilitate economic development and social stability (State
Council 2004).
In this chapter, I will fully discuss China’s social security and welfare schemes.
After a brief review of the traditional welfare programs and the philosophy, I turn to the
demonstration of the Communist Party’s effort of building a full-fledged socialist welfare
system. The course of the socialist welfare state is divided into two phases with the
market reforms introduced in the early 1980s as the partition. The Chinese socialism
fever led to a full-fledged welfare system in its infant years. Fiscal shortage and
institutional failures, however, ruined it in less than three decades. During the reform era,
the majority of rural people and many urbanites were vulnerable to social diseases
associated with the process of modernization.

1. A Transition Society

China is a rapidly industrializing country with a huge population of 1.3 billion and
escalating regional and social imbalances (Table 3.1). In recent years, the Chinese
government has begun to notice that the social tensions associated with such uneven
development and insufficient welfare spending could become a roadblock to its ambitious
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Table 3.1 Comparing China’s GINI Coefficients with Some Other Regions
Regions
China [1981 and 1995]
Eastern Europe
High-income Countries
South Asia
East Asia and the Pacific
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Sahara Africa
Latin America and the
Caribbean

1980s

1990s

Difference

28.8

38.8

+10

25.0

28.9

+3.9

33.2

33.8

+0.7

35.0

31.8

-3.2

38.7

38.1

-0.6

40.5

38.0

-2.5

43.5

47.0

+3.5

49.8

49.3

-0.5

Source: World Bank, 1997.
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economic blueprint. Obviously, the economic boom has not benefited everyone in China.
Despite popular expectations, the rapid economic growth witnessed in the 1990s failed to
provide a safety net for those who might be called the losers from China’s market reform.
Chinese leaders have often found themselves unprepared when facing soaring
social disputes which result in public demonstrations and riots. Former Premier Zhu
Rongji, in office in 1998-2003, expressed to media in 2000 that the building of a
comprehensive social security system is a crucial issue for China’s reform, development
and stability (People’s Daily Dec. 14, 2000). One of the chief tasks for the current
Premier Wen Jiaboa is to establish a modern social security system which will lay the
ground for further reforms in the economic field. In his 2007 government work report,
Premier Wen pledges that the government will promote a new rural cooperative medical
sytem (RCMS). The old RCMS was the pillar of the rural security system in the prereform era. It was completely destroyed when the market reforms were initiated in the
early 1980s (Shi 1993, Ho 1995).
Premier Wen also promises to do more to build a nationwide social security
system which, as many government officials expect, will remedy the imbalanced
development. A more than ten percent increase in social security spending is said to bring
the government budget of 2007 to 201.9 billion yuan, about one percent of the 2006 GDP
(People’s Daily Online March 07, 2007). The new generation of Chinese leaders wants to
construct a harmonious society. With this in mind, the government has made the
restoration of a variety of social security programs and welfare schemes a priority on its
agenda and budget plans.
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1.1 The Communist Takeover
Before the 1949 the Communist takeover, China was dominated by the
Nationalist Party (or Kuomingtang). As the first republican government in the Chinese
history, the Republic of China (ROC) was founded by the Nationalists in 1911 when the
party overthrew the Qing Dynasty and forced the Qing Emperor to resign. The Japanese
invasion during World War II forced the government of the ROC to retreat to western
China. The country split into three parts which were controlled by the Nationalists, the
Communists, and the Japanese occupation forces respectively. After the Japanese was
defeated in 1945, the Nationalists and Communists fought a civil war to determine who
would dominate China. The Communists won the war and established the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. It is not necessary to give a detailed introduction of the
Chinese modern history. Since its first republic government founded in 1911, China had
been in civil wars or the war against the Japanese invasion during which Chinese people
was given no break to increase their well-being, leaving alone the economic growth. The
historical perspective of China matters in this dissertation only when considering that
welfare provisions in the pre-Communist period were by and large absent. The common
characteristics prevailed in developed countries that people relied on state in difficult
times, therefore, did not exist in the republic China before the Communist takeover.

1.2 The Overpopulation Challenge
The PRC is the most populous nation in the world. By the end of 2004, its
population reached 1.3 billion, approximately twenty percent of the world population.
Overpopulation has been a roadblock to development since the mid-1970s when the
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Chinese government first noticed the aggressive population growth was increasing
pressure on its economic. A nationwide policy on birth control was encouraged by the
Deng Xiaoping government in 1979. Although the birth control policy was not legally
enforced, it still had an enormous and extensive impact on Chinese society. Institutions
supervising the implementation of the birth control measures were placed at every level
of government. Every township government had a “Birth Planning Commission,” headed
by a Commissioner whose sole responsibility was to enforce birth control policy.
The one-child policy brought down China’s natural population growth rate to 0.59
percent in 2004 (Table 3.2). The tightening of birth control measures and the increase of
life expectancy turned China into an aging society (Table 3.3). In 2000, the average life
expectancy reached 71.4 years old. By 2004, the aged population (65+) reached 8.58
percent of the total population (CSYB 2005: 96-7).
The population in urban areas has grown significantly since 1949. Shortly after
the establishment of the PRC, the CCP greatly encouraged industrialization. As a result
more labors flowed to urban areas where industrial enterprises congregated (see Table
3.1). In the period of economic rehabilitation, roughly from 1949 to 1952, the industrial
sector experienced an annual growth rate of thirty percent (Beijing Review, June 29,
1979, p.21). The founding fathers of the PRC viewed this instant industrial output as a
confirmation of the superiority of socialism.
China’s undisputed leader at the time, Mao Zedong, was determined to rebuild a
new China that would resume its rightful place among nations as a world power. During
694 national enterprises (Hughes and Luard 1961, p.40). The number of employees in the
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Table 3.2 Natural Population Growth and Aged Population in Selected Years,
1950-2004 (%)
Year

Natural Population Growth

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2004

1.90
2.03
-.46
2.84
2.58
1.57
1.19
1.12
1.44
1.06
.76
.59

Source: CSYB, various issues.
* This figure is for 1999.
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65+ Population/Total
Population
4.88
4.34
4.25
4.37
4.72
5.15
5.52
6.35
6.81*
-

Table 3.3 Average Life Expectancy at Birth in Selected Areas*
Both
Sexes

Year

Area covered

1950
1953
1957

Urban areas in Beijing…
Urban areas in Beijing…
70 cities, 1 county and 126 towns in 11
provinces and municipalities…
Nanning, Liuzhou, Guilin and Wuzhou…
Urban areas in Shanghai
Urban areas in Shanghai
Selected areas in 26 provinces and
municipalities …
Of which: Cities…
Counties
Selected areas in 23 provinces,
municipalities and autonomous regions…
Of which: Cities…
Counties…
Selected areas in 25 provinces,
municipalities and autonomous regions…
The whole country from 1982 population
census…

1957
1964
1972
1975

1978

1980
1981

Male

Female

53.9
61.2

50.2
60.5

69.3
71.7

72.3
73.8

68.2
69.7
67.2

67.2
68.4
66.4

69.3
71.0
68.1

68.2
71.3
67.9

67.0
69.4
66.7

70.0
73.2
69.2

69.0

67.9

70.2

67.9

66.4

69.3

57.0
64.0

Source: China Social Statistics 1986, p.91.
* Calculated by using the standard formula of average life expectancy at birth.
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industrial sector quickly jumped from fifteen millions to twenty one million (Table 3.4).
At the same time, the Communist government initiated a socialist transformation of
capitalism in the sectors of industry, trade, and transportation. In 1958 the Great Leap
Forward (GLF) 4 was launched. During this time the number of employees in the
industrial sector reached seventy million, the highest in Chinese history.

2. Traditional Welfare in China

China’s long history is characterized by dynastic rule. Seven major dynasties
dominated China beginning with the first emperor Ch’in Shih-huang (personal name
Ying Zheng) who unified the Chinese state in 221 B.C.. Since Ch’in Shih-huang every
Chinese ruler has struggled to keep the country in one piece. Ch’in Shih-huang was the
emperor of the Chinese State of Qin from 247 B.C. until 221 B.C. when he finally unified
the country by standardizing the Chinese units of measurements, currency, the length of
cart axles, and the legal system.
Due to its long history, distinct features, and homogeneous population, Chinese
society has been highly developed and unified both culturally and politically. Noting this,
the low level of welfare provision by the Chinese state in the pre-republic era is
inexplicable. Generally, states with a stable central government provide better welfare
benefits to their citizens than fragmented regimes (Hage et al 1989: 272). The German
Empire, for example, was the first regime to initiate and install a nationwide insurance
scheme for industrial workers. Social relief or poor law programs both have typically
4

The Great Leap Forward was an economic and social plan implemented from 1958 to 1960 which aimed
to use China's vast population to rapidly transform mainland China from a primarily agrarian economy into
a modern, industrialized communist society.
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Table 3.4 Urbanization and Industrialization in China in Selected Years
Year
1950
1953
1955
1957
1958
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2004

Urbanization*
11.18
13.31
13.31
15.39
16.25
19.75
17.98
17.38
17.34
19.39
23.71
26.41
29.04
36.22
41.76

Industrialization#
19.80
21.00
25.40
31.70
39.00
31.80
17.38
17.34
19.39
23.71
26.41
29.04
36.22
41.76

Source: CSYB, various issues
*
urban population as percent of the total population
#
industrial outputs as percent of the nation’s gross output
!
employees in industrial sectors (in millions)
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Industrial Employee!
1707
1891
2115
7034
4059
2376
3479
5075
7707
10384
13856
15655
16219
16920

been state-dominated social policies and were both present and widely implemented
during the early industrialization stage in strong states such as Britain and France.
A bias of economic development level or state’s financial capability might exist
when associating government strength with welfare provision. Many argue that states
originally became involved in welfare provision because industrialization profoundly
changed social structures and resulted in the erosion of traditional social support
networks (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965, Rimlinger 1971). The logic of industrialism
typically holds that the emergence of a welfare state reflects the reluctance of states in
assuming the responsibility of welfare provision. The economic model, an approach
viewing state activity strictly based on economic considerations, proposes that states are
passive in welfare provision and meet people’s demands only when resources are
available (Hage et al 1989: 11-13). Issues related to state intervention in welfare
provision have been addressed by many respected scholars.
Compared to the main players such as the working class, elderly groups,
bureaucrats, and legislative institutions, state intervention is seemly a minor factor in the
game of welfare. However, state intervention has never been ruled out as a crucial factor
in welfare studies simply because the maintenance of a political order is one of state’s
ultimate goals (Hage et al 1989). It is not surprising to find that strong states have been
active in setting up comprehensive welfare programs. For example, before the modern
welfare state emerged, both Britain and France had well-established “Poor Law” systems.
Authoritative governments in German and Italy were pioneers in installing health
insurance and actively intervened in education.
Chinese imperial governments developed comparable poor relief systems to the
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previous “Poor Law” systems in Britain or France before the development of modern
welfare states. The Chinese emperor claimed himself to be the son of heaven and borne
with the responsibility of relieving the destitute. However, his responsibility was based
on his position as the son of heaven rather than on any duty to the people or sense of
justice (Zhao 1983). Thus China failed to develop a rights-based welfare system in its
long dynastic history. Although the emperor and his ministers promised people relief
during natural disasters, they did this for social control rather than people’s well-being.
An excerpt from the Book of Rites, a classic Chinese document whose author and
data of publication are unknown provide a clear recording of the people’s desire for a
welfare state. It states that:
When the word prevails, people seek the good of the whole society, select the
wise to govern and stress trust and social harmony. As a result, people not
only take care of their relatives and children, but also work hard to ensure that
all the elderly are well cared for, the strong have opportunities to put their
energy to good use and the young can grown up in healthy ways. The
widowed, lonely, disabled and the sick should all be provided for…. This then
will be the ideal states. (Chow 1987)
In the pre-republic era, state involvement in welfare provision was minimal. For
example, the government’s disaster relief of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) was
extremely meagre. Quoted in Chan and Chow’s More Welfare after Economic Reform,
the following paragraph gives a sense how minimal the government disaster relief was in
the Sung Dynasty.
The people coming for food would not die if they have one meal a day.
Therefore, the healthy ones would only be given a meal a day. They have to
come to the refuge early in the morning or the night before, and then be
provided with rice congee after mid-day…. The principle is not to fill them, so
that they will look for other alternatives of earning a meal, and will not return.
(Chan and Chow 1992: 11)
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Most Chinese imperial governments provided welfare protection and services to
people only for the purpose of mob control and prevention of civil disobedience (Deng
1986: 7, 99, Wong 1992: 334). Throughout the centuries, China has earned the reputation
of being a “land of famine” (Mallory 1926). Disasters such as droughts, floods, pests, bad
weather, and other acts of nature have frequently plagued China. Although many
historical works document a long tradition of famine and disaster relief by the state (Tsu
1912, Mallory 1926, Meng and Wang 1986), such aids can be described as anything but
adequate. As mentioned above in the quotation from Chan and Chow’s work victims of
disasters received only one meal per day and could hardly survive. The widespread
famines coupled with the irresponsibility of government relief resulted in more than ten
thousand civil rebellions. Of the seven major dynasties in Chinese history, six were
directly created by rebellious peasants or the result of peasants’ revolutions against
famine and despotic rule.
The dominant ideology of Chinese Confucianism 5 advocated governing by virtue
and filial piety (or xiao). For centuries, Chinese society was governed by the five cardinal
human relations (wu lun) laid down by the Confucius. They are relations of ruler and
subject, father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, and friends
(Analects of Confucius). Traditional values advocated by Confucianism emphasize social
harmony and political order. Confucius proposed that good governors should treat their
subjects as their children. In other words, the kind of authority exercised by the father in a
patrilineal family is the ideal model for political rulership (Schwartz 1985). Of all the
5

Confucianism is a complex system of moral, social, political, philosophical, and religious thought which
has dominated the culture and history of East Asia up to the 21st century. It could be viewed as the “state
religion” in East Asian countries because of governmental promotion of Confucianist values and needs.
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traditional values underlying the Chinese welfare concept, none surpasses the perception
of family duty (Li and Wu 1985). Many old sayings emphasize that the family is the
primary social care unit. Even today in China most rural Chinese still believe “men rear
sons to provide for old age.” (Wong 1998: 26)

3. Welfare Policies after 1949

Most modern welfare schemes were not available until the Communists came to
power in mainland China. Prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, welfare was no
more than charity provided by private individuals and social groups (Rys 1971). Chinese
imperial governments only provided at most meagre relief to disaster victims. Welfare
provision was not considered an obligation of the state, but rather regarded as an
expression of benevolence from emperors or landlords when exercised. Provincial and
local leaders (xiangshen) occasionally did offer food or shelters to people affected by
calamities; however, these welfare provisions were rather short-lived and unorganized in
pre-republic China. Family and friends were the primary care units in Chinese society.
They were also the last resort for the majority of Chinese during difficult times. The
rights-base welfare system which developed in Western societies in the late nineteen
century was by and large nonexistent in pre-Communist Chinese society.

3.1 Social Security 6
The newly established Communist government was quick in assuming the
responsibility of welfare provision. The CCP inherited a backward economy with
6

In China, it is also called labor insurance, or more usually social protection after 1990.
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infrastructure and industrial equipment almost completely ruined from war. However,
this did not impair the CCP’s ambition of building a socialist state with a full-fledged
welfare system providing its war-torn people with a variety of benefits. In 1950, the first
social welfare measure Relieving Unemployed Workers Regulations (jiuji shiye gongren
de banfa) was adopted to resolve the postwar unemployment and poverty. This temporary
welfare measure was soon replaced by the Labor Insurance Regulations (LIR), which
became the official law on March 1, 1951.
The LIR was a comprehensive social insurance scheme which applied to workers
and staff employed in state-operated, joint state-private, private and cooperative factories,
mines and their subsidiary units with more than 100 employees. Persons employed in
capital construction, railway, shipping or postal and telecommunications enterprises and
their associated units were covered by the LIR as well. In 1953, the LIR was revised to
extend its coverage to administrative organs, mines, factories, and subordinate units
associated with those targeted enterprises. Temporary workers and apprentices were
given full access to the LIR benefits. As a basic social insurance law, the LIR was further
modified in 1958 and 1978 respectively. But the fundamental principles of the LIR were
relatively maintained and still remain valid regulations on labor insurance today.
The LIR was both comprehensive and generous in welfare provision to workers.
Labor insurance in the regulations included old-age pensions, health insurance, workers’
compensation, paid sickness leave, maternity benefits for women and many other welfare
services (White and Shang 1996). The protection of workers’ health was made the
primary objective of the LIR. Article 1 states that “[t]hese Regulations are
formulated….for the purpose of protecting the health of paid laborers and easing the
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special difficulties in their livelihood.” People whose health might be jeopardized due to
their work responsibilities were entitled old-age pensions. Article 4 states that people
engaged in a harmful working environment “shall be entitled to enjoy the remuneration
of old-age pensions.”
A strong socialist welfare ideology prevailed in the LIR. It states in Article 7 of
Chapter II that the expenditure on the benefits enjoyed by workers “shall be borne by the
administration or capital of each enterprise which practices labor insurance.” This was a
fundamental principle first laid down by V. I. Lenin in 1912 and was practically
consolidated in 1922 with the Russian Labor Law (Madison 1979). The LIR also
mandates in Article 8 that enterprises should pay into a labor insurance fund a sum equal
to three percent of their total payroll. It also states that “[t]hese labor insurance funds
shall not be deducted from the wages of the workers and staff members nor be separately
collected from them.” This social insurance fund was put under the supervision of the
All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its subordinates. It was used to provide for
old-age pensions and other collective welfare undertakings.
The 1951 LIR was the most advanced and extensive welfare program in the
world, even compared with the welfare programs in the most advanced industrialized
countries at that time. Workers wounded while at work were given full access to medical
treatment at hospitals or clinics with the costs completely borne by the work unit. During
the treatment period, injured workers could receive the first three months’ wages in full
and 30-60 percent of their wages for the next three months if the medical treatment
continued. As for pension, a male worker could retire at 60 if he had worked at least 25
years. Female workers could retire at 50 if they had worked at least 20 years. After
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retirement retirees were to receive a pension with the sum of 35-60 percent of their wages
at retirement from the labor insurance fund. Maternity leave compensation was generous
as well. A female worker could be granted full wage for 56 days before or after giving
birth. In addition, she could have up to 30 days leave with full payment during her
pregnancy.
Compared with urban areas, social security was limited and underdeveloped in
rural areas. Social security in rural areas could largely be characterized as minor income
maintenance measures. Throughout history, Chinese society has been an agricultural
entity and rulers in each dynasty developed their governing philosophy by encouraging
cultivation and maintaining the feudal order in rural areas. Between 1950 and 1951, the
Communist government undertook a thorough land reform assigning each household a
piece of cultivable land. The land became the primary source of income for Chinese
peasants. However, a second land reform in the middle 1950s compelled peasants to join
collectives which later became the People’s Communes, centrally controlled property
with enforced egalitarian distribution (Guan 2000). As a result, Chinese peasants were
deprived of their income from land. They began to rely on collectives for both livelihood
and welfare.
In fact, rural people have never been entitled to any formal pension scheme. Paid
sickness leave or work-related injury compensation might have existed in some People’s
Communes, these benefits never became long-term or organized measures. The Chinese
government did not have the necessary financial resources or personnel to undertake such
a huge project as providing pensions to China’s hundreds of millions rural residents.
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3.2 Social Welfare and Relief
Relief work in China was divided into disaster relief and social relief. The
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) is the current government body in charge of relief
welfare work. Before 1978, the MCA was known as the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MIA) which apart from welfare was also in charge of a number of political and
administrative programs. In urban areas in order to be eligible for relief from state one of
three requirements had to be met. The first requirement was the “Three-Nos,” referring to
those who have no family support, no work ability, and no means of livelihood
(Minzheng Cidian 1987: 168-9). The second group who was eligible for state relief was
poverty-stricken households. Households with several disabled people or many young
children were deemed to lack the ability to support themselves, and thus fell into this
category. Finally, aged workers who were laid of during the nationwide austerity period
(1961-1965) and had already reached the retirement age were eligible to receive a
monthly relief equal to forty percent of their former wage.
The primary source of welfare benefits for rural residents was the Five Guarantees
(wubao) system. This community-based social relief system developed as the main
institutional arrangement for the most vulnerable social groups in rural areas (Chen
1994). Namely, the Five Guarantees included the provision of food, clothing, fuel,
funeral services, and school fees to disabled or aged people in rural areas free of charge.
This system was formally introduced during the collectivization period in the mid-1950s.
This system soon became a widely established welfare measure due to the
communization effort in 1958 and remains essentially unchanged today. Since the Five
Guarantees system was a community-based welfare scheme, its finances and operations
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were tightly controlled by commune leaders. Each cooperative commune was to decide
what would be adequate for the people covered by the scheme, but in no case was aid to
exceed the average quota of the commune. Thus, the Five Guarantees system provided
only the minimal welfare to the most disadvantaged people in rural areas. By and large, it
was a means-tested scheme since the entitlement was given to people who would not
survive themselves and had no relative to rely on.

3.3. Health Insurances and Services
After the promulgation of the 1951 LIR, the Chinese government issued several
health insurance regulations covering different social groups. In 1952, the Administration
Council (State Council) issued a set of regulations regarding health care for employees at
different levels of the People’s Government, parties, organizations, and their subordinate
units. The State Council also issued the Government Employee Health Insurance
Schemes (GIS) which laid down the principles regarding health care benefits for workers
in public sectors. Both the LIR and the GIS were financed by general revenues. The
regulations from these two documents provide generous health insurance benefits for
urban residents. Beneficiaries can receive large outpatient and inpatient services with no
charge. Employees in public sectors and collective enterprises can receive full
reimbursement on all medical treatments and drug expenses.
In rural areas, the Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) was the primary
health insurance program. It provided the rural population with basic health services for
free or at a very low price in some districts. During the 1960s and 1970s, the RCMS was
widely established in rural areas and fully supported by the government. It was reported
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that more than ninety percent of China’s villages had established a RCMS by the mid1970s (Carrin et al. 1999). The RCMS generally used the production brigade as its
primary accounting unit. The RCMS was a subsidized community-based insurance
program which employs local individuals trained as paramedics. Trained health workers
provided limited curative services and referred patients to more sophisticated health
facilities such as township or country hospitals if needed.
The RCMS was financed by three primary sources of revenue: a very small
portion of individual contributions collected by the commune, collected welfare funds,
and subsidies by the local county’s general revenue. During the 1960s and 1970s, the
RCMS was mostly financed by the People’s Communes as the rural economy was
collectively organized and distributed. However, with the People’s Communes gradually
being phased out in the late 1970s, the RCMS has since imposed severe financial burdens
on collectives and the state (Figure 3.1).

4. Welfare Programs in the Reform Era

During its socialist construction and consolidation period, the new Communist China was
by and large an agricultural society. The Communist leadership determined to mimic the
Soviet central planning mechanism and industrial structure to seek instant
industrialization. Progress was quickly made and rapid industrialization was achieved.
This progress was widely celebrated and viewed as a vital sign of socialism’s superiority.
The likelihood of confrontation with Taiwan coupled with the military disputes
with the U.S. in North Korea and then in Vietnam led China to focus on developing
heavy industry.
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Figure 3.1 Financing and Distribution of the RCMS
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Things began to change when the political environment became more amicable and the
country was integrated into the international community. Since the mid-1980s, the
Chinese welfare system has experience a series of reforms. Deng Xiaoping launched the
market reforms in the early 1980s. As a result China experienced an economic boom and
the country was flourishing until state enterprise reforms caused unemployment
problems, leaving millions of workers jobless. In 1984 shortly after the announced
reforms of major state-own enterprises (SOEs), the old-age pension reform was
promulgated. Two years later in 1986, unemployment insurance was formally established
in urban areas. Reforms on maternity insurance, work-related injury insurance, and health
insurance for urban employees were later undertaken in 1994, 1996, and 1998
respectively.
In 1993, Shanghai took the lead by setting up its Minimum Living Standard
Security System (MLS) for urban residents. In 1997, the State Council sent out a notice
requiring the establishment of similar systems in all cities of the nation. By the end of
1999, a MLS had been established in 667 cities of different sizes and in 1,682 counties
across the nation. Thus far the system has greatly benefited the non-agricultural
population in many areas. By the spring of 2001, some 4,160,000 persons were benefiting
from the system, with an average monthly allowance of 60 yuan (US$7.3) per person
(People’s Daily December 24, 2006)
The rural Minimum Living Standard Security System (RMLS) was carried into
execution in 2006. China would establish subsistence allowances for the rural poor all
around country. This ambitious mission was to overseen by the MCA. A pilot system was
first established in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces in 1997. Since then, among
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China’s 2,862 counties, over 2,000 have thus far established the system. People’s Daily
reported on December 24, 2006, about ten million rural poor had benefited from
subsistence allowances, accounting for 42 percent of the rural population under the
influence of poverty.

4.1 The Labor Contract System and Urban Laid-offs
The Chinese government has pursed an active policy of employment since its
ambitious economic construction goals were first promulgated in the early 1950s.
Throughout the 1960s, various effective measures aimed at increasing the rate of
employment were adopted and implemented (Chan and Chow 1992, Wong 1998). The
full employment policy is the result of the socialist ideology of promoting an egalitarian
society. It has prevailed in Chinese society while the economic construction was set as
the upmost goal.
With the market mechanism being introduced to replace the faulty planning
system, the industrial structure also experienced radical changes in the 1980s. First, the
heavy industry priority was abandoned. The Chinese leadership noticed that setting heavy
industry as the primary sector was no longer necessary as the nation had stepped out of
the cloud of severe external threats. The state’s chief objective now became achieving
rapid economic growth and improving people’s living standard (Oi 1996, 1999, Yao
1999). The government began to stress the development of labor-intensive enterprises
with comparative advantages and market potential. As a result of the new development
strategies, the Chinese economy witnessed a boom in small and medium-sized enterprises
capable of offering employment to a large number of people. Many township and village
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enterprises (TVEs) were founded and eventually integrated to the Chinese economy
during this period.
Secondly, the reform of SOEs forced its way onto the public agenda. Although it
actually came after the reform initiated in rural areas, the reform of SOEs launched in the
early 1980s captured much of the attention of external observers (Naughton 1995:7,
Lardy 1998). The first phase of enterprise reforms was the increasement of operational
autonomy accorded to enterprise managers who, not surprisingly, were mostly party
cadres or government officials enjoying benefits associated with their rank. The primary
weapon used to encourage management responsibility was the profit retention policy.
This policy was widely adopted in state enterprises in 1979-1980. Enterprise-retained
profits were used by managers to increase investments, improve workers’ wages or
benefits, or allocate rewards for distinguished workers. The second phase of state
enterprise reform was the introduction of the labor contract system in 1984 (Nauthton
1995: 262-3). A famous slogan of the reformers was “breaking the iron rice bowl”
(Putterman, 1992). This referred to the reformers’
intention of lessening the income and job security of the individual state
employee who, heretofore, is said to have felt little pressure to perform on the
job; and to the parallel aim of reducing the financial security of the state
enterprise managers who, while now provided with some incentives to
increase profits, could continue to expect state subsidies in the even of losses.
(Putterman, 1992)
However, what the enterprise reforms really did to the state employee was far beyond
the promotion of work ethic. For various political reasons, the urban working class had been
benefiting from being employed by state enterprises as permanent wage earners. The real
income of state employees far exceeded their cash wages due to the value of subsidies,
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insurance, and other benefits they received (Ibid). One of the most significant impacts of the
SOE reforms was workers’ decreasing reliance on enterprises they were working for. As a
result of the urban reforms, state control over the financial resources and the behavior of
workers was weakened. Moreover, the private sector began to expand into areas traditionally
dominated by state enterprises. Table 3.5 explains the changes of employed workers in the
public and private sectors from the pre- and post-reform era.
Reforms of the SOEs were of highest concern in China (Putterman 1992, Walder
1995). Three basic goals were to be achieved during the enterprise reforms. First, every
enterprise was required to negotiate a contract with the appropriate level of government
to set up an adequate profit and taxation level. Second, enterprises were urged to
undertake overall reforms. Life-long employments, fixed salaries, and inadequate welfare
provision were going to be gradually abandoned. Third, enterprises were forced to sell
their products in a competitive market and were mostly excluded from government
subsidies. World Bank conducted a study on China’s taxation system reforms and found
that more than 80% of enterprises had contracts with their respective governments
(World Bank 1990).

Table 3.5 Employees in the Public and Private Sectors in the Chinese Urban Economy in
1980 and 1995 (% of total employees)
1980
Stateowned
Employed
Workers

76.2

Collective Private
23.0

0.8

1995
Stateowned
64.7

Collective Private
18.1

17.2

Source: China Statistical Publishing House (1996), China Statistic Yearbook (1996), p.
30.
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Enterprise reforms led to the disconnection of individuals with their work units.
Compensation for laid-off workers was used to ease the transition to privatization during
enterprise reforms and also helped promote production efficiency in state sectors. This
design allowed SOE managers to fire employees at a mutually agreed compensation. It
was estimated that nearly 26 million (one-fifth of the total workforce) in SOEs are laid
off from 1998-2002 (World Bank 2003). A market economy requires that workers’ wages
should reflect productivity. Thus the “iron rice bowl” policy or lifelong job security and
cradle-to-grave welfare guarantee were necessarily replaced by a contractual employment
system. Enterprise reforms also introduced labor market elements. First, the power of
managers in collective and SOEs was increased significantly. They were given the
freedom to hire, discipline and dismiss workers. Second, as early as 1984, the newly
introduced contractual employment system allowed SOEs to treat the new workers
differently from the tenured workers. Recently hired workers received neither lifetime
employment nor the same level of non-wage benefits. 7

4.2 Reforms in the Welfare System
In response to the enterprise reforms and surging of urban laid-offs, in the early
1980s the Chinese government carried out a set of reforms in its social welfare regime
with the goal of establishing a standardized social security system independent of state
enterprises and institutions (Appendix I). This new social security system was to extend
its coverage to both employed and unemployed people (Table 3.6). In contrast to the old
7

For details about the differences between old labor regulations and the labor contract system introduced in
the 1980s, please refer to The Administration and Financing of Social Security in China by Nelson W. S.
Chow, pp.77-80.
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Table 3.6 Selected Social Security Schemes and the Coverage, 1994-2004 (10,000
persons)
Year

Unemployment Insurance

Contributors Beneficiaries
1994 7968
196.5
1995 8238.0
261.3
1996 8333.1
330.8
1997 7961.4
319.0
1998 7927.9
158.1
1999 9852.0
271.4
2000 10408.4
329.7
2001 10354.6
468.5
2002 10181.6
657.0
2003 10372.4
741.6
2004 10583.9
753.5
Source: CSYB 2005, table 23-38.

Medical
Insurance
Contributors
374.6
702.6
791.2
1588.9
1508.7
1509.4
2862.8
5470.7
6925.8
7974.9
9044.5
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Work Injury Insurance
Contributors
1822.1
2614.8
3102.6
3507.8
3781.3
3912.3
4350.3
4345.3
4405.6
4574.8
6845.2

Beneficiaries
5.8
7.1
10.1
12.5
15.3
15.1
18.8
18.7
26.5
29.5
51.9

system which was directly financed from the government’s general revenue or enterprise
profits, the new social security system was to be funded from various channels and
socially managed. Also at this time a mandatory state-supervised social security system
was implemented to meet people’s basic welfare needs. With China’s rapid progress after
its economic reforms, the social security network was said to eventually cover the entire
population. In 2004, the government allocated 462.7 billion yuan to be used for social
security payments, 38.27 times greater than the figure for 1989 (CSYB 2005: table 2339).
The state also began to actively promote a multi-level social security and welfare
system. A second-line social welfare and relief scheme aimed at helping disadvantaged
groups was initiated. After more than a decade, a social welfare system covering the basic
needs of various social groups had roughly been established. The majority of urban staff
and retirees, urban unemployed, and floating peasant workers in some regions were
protected against poverty associated with catastrophic illness and unemployment. Five
welfare schemes aimed at improving the efficiency and equality of the welfare system
were gradually implemented. In the following sections, I will discuss these new programs
in detail.

4.2.1 The “Two Guarantees” and “Three Lines of Protection”
As the main goals of welfare reform were to facilitate the economic transition and
to improve market efficiency the process of welfare reform has been very pragmatic. It
has been piecemeal since welfare reforms were initiated at different times and adopted to
meet different needs. The market reforms in urban areas consisted largely of remedial
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responses to the institutional dysfunction of the centrally planned economic system.
SOEs, as the primary targets of the market reforms, were forced to cutting back the
pensions and health care benefits for their employees. “Redundant workers,” mostly older
or poorly educated persons, were laid off to improve productivity. The market reforms
basically shut the door of “full employment” and therefore the “iron rice bowl” policy
was no longer available for urban residents. A more competitive labor market was
gradually installed to facilitate the enterprise reforms. With the new labor policy, wages
became separate from various employer-provided benefits, and the unemployed were to
be taken care of by the new social security programs rather than by the enterprise they
had been laid of from.
In order to transfer the enterprise-based welfare system to a community or
society-based system, the Chinese government adopted a “two guarantees” policy in 1998.
The first guarantee is the basic livelihood of the workers laid-off from SOEs. The
government established reemployment service centers for laid-off workers. These centers
provide laid-off workers with allowances or basic living expenses and social insurance
premiums. The second guarantee was given to all retirees from state sectors. Their basic
livelihood was ensured and basic pensions were paid in full with the reemployment
service funds. The “three lines of protection” were implemented to ensure the “two
guarantees” policy. First, laid-off persons from SOEs can receive a basic living allowance
(jiben shenghuo baozhang) from the reemployment service centers for up to three years.
Second, in case they still have not found a job within three years, they can receive
unemployment insurance payments (shiye baoxian jin) for a maximum of two years.
Third, if they remain unemployed at the end of this two-year period, they can apply for
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the minimum living standard allowance (zuidi shenghuo baozhang fei), to which all
impoverished urban residents are entitled.

4.2.2 The Minimum Living Standard Security System
The reforms of the urban social relief system began in 1993. After the market
reforms had been in place for more than a decade, the population of urban laid-off
workers and long-term unemployed grew to a level that the government could no longer
overlook. Since social stability has always been a top priority for the Chinese government,
the reform of the urban social relief system pushed its way to the top of the public agenda.
In 1999, a Minimum Living Standard Security System (MLS) was installed in all cities
after several years of trial in selected cities. Meanwhile, the Chinese government
officially promulgated the Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’ Minimum
Standard of Living to ensure the basic livelihood of all urban residents.
Financing and management of the MLS are shouldered by the fiscal budgets of
local governments. The allowances of the MLS are also determined by local governments
based on the necessary costs for maintaining the basic livelihood of the local urbanities.
The urban population covered by the MLS has been increasing significantly. In 2001,
eleven million urban residents are reported to have drawn the minimum living allowance.
That year the total budget for the MLS reached 2.3 billion yuan or about one percent of
the central revenue (People’s Daily December 24, 2006). Since 2005, some rural areas
have been preparing to introduce similar minimum living standard security systems
which, if established, will cover an even larger portion of the Chinese impoverished
population.
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4.2.3 The Old-Age Insurance System
The first attempts to reform the old-age insurance system were made in selected
cities in 1984. After a decade of trials and careful evaluations, in 1997 the Chinese
government finally adopted the Decision on Establishing a Uniform Basic Old-Age
Insurance System for Enterprise Employees. This regulation has since been widely
implemented throughout the country. Employees of all urban enterprises may participate
in the basic old-age insurance program. Enterprises and employees in towns and cities
have been required by the Labor Law 8 to pay the basic old-age insurance premiums. At
present, roughly twenty percent of the enterprise payroll bill and eight percent of personal
wages are automatically saved to the insurance accounts.
The urban old-age insurance system has two separate accounts (Figure 3.2). One
is a mutual assistance account and the other is a personal account. These mutual
assistance accounts are established by funds taken from the basic insurance premiums
collected from enterprises. The remaining funds are used to set up the personal accounts.
The basic old-age insurance premiums paid by individuals go entirely into their own
personal accounts. Normally, a retiree can draw from the mutual assistance funds to
which only the enterprises are required to contribute. A monthly payment of up to twenty
percent of the average social wage is paid out of the mutual funds. In additional, the
retiree can draw monthly from his personal account up to 1/120 of the total accumulated
amount.

8

Chinese labor law consists of a multiplicity of national and local laws. The Labor Law Act (Labor Law of
the People’s Republic of China) in force since January 1, 1995, represents the most significant legal source
in this area. Local regulations supplement national law but modify it in some areas.
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Individual
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Outpatient
(individual
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Figure 3.2 Funding and Benefit Structure of the Social Insurance Program (Liu 2002b)
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Participants in the old-age insurance program increased from 86.71 million in 1997 to
108.02 million by the end of 2001 (CSYB 2004: 195). The number of basic old-age
pensioners also jumped from 25.33 million to 33.81 million. In 1991, China began to
introduce the old-age insurance system in some affluent rural areas. The basic principle
for the rural old-age insurance system is different from the one installed in urban areas.
The premiums are to be paid mainly by the beneficiaries rather than the institutions they
are working for. There are collectively pooled funds available for rural participants as
well. Personal accounts are available to encourage saving for old age.

4.2.4 The Medical Insurance System
Before the market reforms, urban residents relied heavily on their work units to
pay for medical services. Under the command economic system, the employees received
the benefits while the employers bore the costs. In 1988, the State Council formed a
group to plan the formation of a health care reform program. In 1992, their planning
resulted in the introduction of risk pooling in urban medical insurance reforms. Pooling
risk was the key institutional innovation that radically increased the level of socialization
and correspondingly reduced welfare differences among urban residents. In addition, an
individual medical insurance account was created on behalf of every insured urban
resident. This is called the social insurance program (shebao jihua).
The Decision on Establishing the Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban
Employees was officially issued in 1998. With this regulation, the Chinese government
began to enforce a basic medical insurance system for urban employees throughout the
country. By the end of 2001, 97 percent of prefectures and cities had created a basic
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medical insurance scheme. About 76.29 million employees had participated in a basic
medical insurance scheme. In addition, free medical services and other forms of medical
security systems covered more than 100 million urbanities (see Appendix I).

4.2.5 The Unemployment Insurance System
Unemployment insurance was by and large nonexistent in the pre-reform period
since the Chinese government had been pursuing an active employment policy. The “full
employment” and “iron rice bowel” have been well known policies of the Chinese labor
law. However, the market reforms and economic transitions in the early 1980s radically
altered the Chinese labor policy on unemployment. In 1999, about two decades after the
market reforms, the Chinese government issued the Regulations on Unemployment
Insurance. The new regulations mandate that all urban enterprises and their staff mush
pay the unemployment insurance premiums. The contribution for enterprises is two
percent of the salary payment to the employee. For the employee, the contribution is one
percent of his or her total wage income. An unemployment insurance participant can
draw benefits from the insurance funds if three conditions are met. First, he or she must
have paid at least one year of insurance premiums. Second, his or her unemployment
status must not be a voluntary one. Third, the unemployed person must register with
reemployment centers and apply for reemployment. Since the installation of the
unemployment insurance system, the coverage has grown continuously. The number of
participants has increased from 79.28 million in 1998 to 103.55 million in 2001 (see
Table 3.7).
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5. Conclusion

This chapter introduces the Chinese welfare state programs in both urban and
rural areas. Policies about welfare provision have been subjects of major reforms and
subsequent readjustments since the early 1950s. Before the market reforms radically
altered welfare policies in the early 1980s, the Chinese people received generous welfare
benefits from the state. Basically, the state and work units cooperatively provided a full
range of social security schemes to urban residents. Apart from the absence of
unemployment insurance due to the Chinese government’s “full employment” policy
orientation, urban employees enjoyed old-age pensions, sickness leave compensation,
medical insurance and health service, maternity benefits, and other various perks such as
free housing, low-cost education, and food stamps or subsidies.
Welfare programs in rural areas, however, are underdeveloped and poorly funded.
The gap between urban and rural areas grows continuously when the market reforms
profoundly remake China’s production mechanism and income distribution. In the prereform era, peasants could receive social relief and welfare benefits from the state. Many
welfare programs with a relief purpose were installed because the centrally planned
economy enabled the government to allocate fiscal resources to help the destitute. During
difficult times, rural households could rely on local governments. But the majority of
peasants did not have access to pension, housing allowance, or food subsidies which
enjoyed by urbanities.
A strong socialist ideology dominated the welfare policy making in the prereform era. As early as 1951, the CCP had made a comprehensive social security system,
the LRS. This labor insurance scheme was revised in 1953 to extend its coverage to
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almost all urban residents. Welfare benefits provided by the state and work units were
both comprehensive and generous even in western standard. The CCP claimed to be the
liberators of the Chinese people who were exploited by domestic and international
capitalists and feudal landlords. Before the CCP came to power, the Jiangxi and Shananxi
Communist regimes had tried to establish social welfare and relief programs. Slogans
such as “beating landlords and allocating land” and “removing the three big mountains” 9
were widely spread to gain peasants and workers’ support. In 1949 leaders of the newly
established People’s Republic of China announced that the regime was to base on the
firm coalition of workers and peasants. The Communist regime had since installed a
comprehensive welfare system which was hardly affordable.
The financial burden associated with the social security and welfare programs
escalated to an intolerable level in the early 1960s. The government began to shift the
financing responsibility to work units and individuals. Although insurants of LRS were
given full coverage and rarely asked to pay the premium, their welfare benefits had been
decreasing. Some work units were in bad financial condition and thus could not provide
even the basic social security and welfare benefits to their employees. After market
reforms were implemented, income gap between employees in different work units grew
quickly. In the early 1980s, workers of some loss-making SOEs made most complaints
about their shrinking welfare benefits.
Since the early 1990s, the government has pragmatically restored some state or
market-financed social security and welfare schemes. The government has noticed that

9

The three big mountains, according to Mao Zedong are imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic
capitalism.
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pooling welfare funds can significantly lower risks and costs that were previously borne
by individual work units. New welfare programs were experimented in selected provinces
and promulgated throughout the country when passing necessary tests. For example,
unemployment insurance was widely adopted in the early 2000. It has become one of the
basic social rights for employees in urban areas. In the reform era, increasing
comprehensiveness of the social security system becomes obvious. Self-employed or
unemployed urban residents can receive welfare benefits from the government and
market-funded welfare schemes. An effort to reduce the urban and rural welfare benefit
gap has become a serious concern of the government. Since 2005, the rural minimum
living standard has been gradually raised to 650 yuan ($84.5) per year. Medical insurance
is available to rural people. The new RCMS lays down the ground for peasants to enjoy
low-cost medical services.
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CHAPTER 4: China’s Multiple Transitions and Welfare Spending:
General and Specific Factors

Some states have actively involved in the construction of welfare systems while others
have been rather passive. Nonetheless, as time goes on more advanced and
comprehensive welfare systems continue to develop around the world. Debates about the
state’s role in welfare state expansion have been less about why welfare states expanded
than why they had developed in such different ways (Myles and Quadagno 2002).
Welfare systems in different countries seem to be developing in many different ways, and
this is certainly true in China. So the questions to consider now are: Why the Chinese
welfare state has developed the way it has? How have factors such as China’s long
dynastic history and huge population influenced this development? Another important
issue to consider at this point is China’s astounding income gaps between urban and rual
areas. The rapid catch-up industrialization pursued in the last few decades, the pathbreaking but gradualist-mannered economic reforms (Pei 2006), and the recent
astounding economic growth will all be considered in this chapter in an effort to examine
what a socialist welfare state with Chinese characteristics really means.
This chapter discusses China’s multiple transitions and the impacts they have
placed on the government’s welfare spending. I will demonstrate these impacts by
exploring the general and specific factors. The general factors are elements coping with
macro perspectives of the Chinese economic reforms. They are the approaches scholars
developed to examining the contradiction found in China’s economic growth and welfare
spending. The Chinese welfare state is at odds with many advanced Western welfare
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states which raise budget on welfare during economic prosperity. The specific factors are
consequences of the general factors. These factors represent the institutional transitions
that I believe to have influenced the development of the Chinese welfare state. They are
discussed in their relevance to welfare spending. These specific factors are to be further
examined in the subsequent chapter in which they are the independent variables.

1. The General Factors

The Chinese economy has flourished in recent years experiencing a rapid GDP
growth rate of ten percent for more than a decade (Zheng 1994, Walder 1995b). As many
researches have discovered, China’s rapid rise is highly correlated with various factors
including institutional innovations, economic reform, and cultural mobility (McKinnon
1992, Nee 1992, Cui 1994, Oi 1992, 1996, Jefferson and Rawski 1994, Rawski 1994a,
1994b, Walder 1994a).

1.1 The Economistic State Orientation 10

The development strategy adopted by the Chinese government has attracted
scholars from many disciplines (Walder 1995b, Duckett 1998, Chen 2002, Burns 2003).
Researchers have examined the Chinese development strategy through various
approaches including culture and society, economics, and institutions. Before the 1990s,
however, most studies on the Chinese economic reform were conducted by scholars who
were interested in the Chinese economic development rather than the evolvement of the
10

By economistic state orientation, I mean the state is actively involved in and dominates the nation’s
economic activities. State bureaucrats also personally participate in commercial sectors or directly manage
enterprises and, therefore, are held responsible for economic growth and profit-making.

74

Chinese society. Few of them attempted to build the correlation between changes in
Chinese society and the ongoing economic reform (Peng, 1992, Walder, 1989, Xie and
Hannum, 1996, Yao, 1999, Zhou, 2000).
The trajectory of the Chinese economic reform and growth indicates that
reformers are explicitly pragmatic. Minxin Pei (2006: 25-9) points out that China’s
reform is a strong gradualist model. The Chinese leadership does not conceal the
incremental and pragmatic economic reform. For example, the former Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping said that whether white or black, a good cat is the one which catch the
mouse (Goldstein 1995). Similar statements have been pervasive in governmental
publications and speeches by political leaders. Some scholars suggest that these
documents and speeches have expressly articulated the Chinese governing body’s
intension of embracing economic growth as the primary goal (Ibid).
Since the 1980s, an economistic developmental strategy has been introduced and
widely implemented in Chinese society. As an omnipotent power, the CCP does not have
to create a broad-based coalition. According to David Waldner (1999), a broad coalition
means more side payment for costly welfare policies while narrow coalitions cost less
and enable the government to allocate scarce resources to the most productive sectors of
the economy. The Chinese-style gradualist reform does not detonate the privatization
avalanche as witnessed in Easter European countries and the former Soviet Union.
Instead the active involvement of state bureaucrats in the economic sector has created a
strong economistic developmental strategy. As Jane Duckett (2000) points out, state
entrepreneurialism often creates problems of uneven service provision, especially the
underinvestment in social welfare. This strategy leads policy-makers, primarily state
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bureaucrats, to abandon long-sustained social welfare policies such as low cost medical
plans, high investment in public education, general revenue financed pensions, and public
housing systems.
The economistic developmental strategy is embedded in the pattern of the
government revenue and expenditure (Figure 4.1). In 1951 the Chinese government
reaped 12.4 billion yuan of revenue. The total expenditure in that year was 12.2 billion
yuan. In the next thirty years, that is the period from 1951-80, the government made a
decuple revenue growth and the expenditure rise was approximately the same size. In
1980, the revenue and expenditure reached 115.99 billion yuan and 122.88 billion yuan
respectively. This sharp growth happened after the economic reforms were introduced.
From 1980 to 2000, both the revenue and expenditure experienced a decuple growth
(Table 4.1). The growth rate clearly accelerated at a rapid pace as the second decuple rise
was achieved in less than twenty years.
Since the 1970s, the welfare expenditure of the Chinese government has been
very stable (Figure 4.2). Approximately two percent of GDP was used for welfare
purposes in each year (Table 4.2). Due to the economistic state orientation, the Chinese
government only spends an average of 1.58 percent of its total expenditure on social
security and welfare. This spending is extremely low as compared to the government
expenditure in advanced industrial countries such as Japan, USA, and UK. As Table 4.3
shows, Japan’s spending on social security and welfare has been approximately 18.8
percent of the central government’s total expenditure. The figures for the USA and UK
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Figure 4.1 The Chinese Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1950-2004 (100 million
yuan)
Source: CSYB 2000, p. 255. CSYB 2005, p. 271.

Table 4.1 The Chinese Government Revenue and Expenditure in Selected Years (in 100
million yuan)
Year
1951
1980
2000

Revenue
124.96
1159.93
13395.23

Expenditure
122.07
1228.83
15886.50

Source: CSYB 2005 p. 89.
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Figure 4.2 Social Security and Welfare Expenditure as Percent of the Total Payroll, 19761990 (% of payroll)
Source: CSYB, various issues.

Table 4.2 The Chinese Government Expenditure on Welfare, Economic Construction
(economy), and Defense (in 100 million yuan)
Year

Total

1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2004

262.7
643.7
460.0
649.4
820.9
1228.8
2004.3
3083.6
6823.7
15886.5
28486.9

On
Welfare
4.94
7.94
10.94
6.53
12.88
20.31
31.15
55.04
115.46
213.03
563.46

% of
Total
1.88
1.23
2.38
1.01
1.57
1.65
1.55
1.78
1.69
1.34
1.98

On
Economy
137.62
460.71
254.11
392.61
481.66
715.46
1127.55
1368.01
2855.78
5748.36
7933.25

Source: CSYB, various issues.
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% of
Total
52.38
71.57
57.55
60.46
58.68
58.22
56.26
44.36
41.85
36.18
27.85

On
Defense
65.00
58.00
86.76
145.26
142.46
193.84
191.53
290.31
636.72
1207.54
2200.01

% of
Total
24.74
9.01
18.86
22.37
17.35
15.77
9.56
9.41
9.33
7.60
7.72

Table 4.3 Government Expenditures on Welfare and Health as Percentages* of the Total
Expenditure in Four Countries
Year

China 1

Welfare
1972 1.01
1975 1.57
1980 1.65
1985 1.55
1990 1.78
1993 1.62
1995 1.69
1998 1.59
1999 1.36
2000 1.34
Mean 1.58

Health
0.75
0.92
1.02
1.71
2.25
1.47
1.35

Japan 2

USA 3

Welfare Health
19.83
1.34
18.82
0.94
18.68
0.88
16.57
0.81
19.15
0.90
0.72
19.74
0.65
18.80
0.89

Welfare
32.66
36.60
34.10
29.07
25.56
29.12
29.18
28.71
28.75
28.25
30.20

UK 4
Health
8.55
9.34
10.43
11.29
13.48
17.10
19.17
20.41
20.50
28.55
13.88

Welfare
24.76
21.68
26.69
33.74
31.88
36.51
36.23
36.50
24.76
30.31

Health
12.19
12.90
13.47
13.73
13.19
13.60
14.00
15.42
12.19
13.41

Source: *: percentages are calculated based on original data from sources.
1. CSYB, various issues; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
2. Japan Statistical Yearbook 1995, p.494-7; and Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 13539. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
3 & 4. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
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are even higher. The average expenditure in these two countries is 30.2 and 30.31 percent
respectively. Figure 4.3 suggests that the welfare expenditure of the Chinese government
is the lowest and stagnant.
A relatively bigger portion of the Chinese government expenditure goes to
economic affairs. In 2001, the Chinese government spent 13.7 percent of its budget on
economic affairs such as mining, manufacturing, construction, and fuel and energy
(Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2003: 111-2). During the same period, the
USA and UK spent only 6.44 and 4.35 percent, respectively, of their total central
government budgets on economic affairs (Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2003:
464-5). Figure 4.4 suggests that Chinese household and government consumption
expenditures have sharply grown in recent years. However, household consumption as a
share of GDP has gradually decreased since 1979 when economic reforms were first
initiated (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.4 indicates that the household consumption expenditure has grown faster
than government consumption expenditure since 1970. This suggests that the disposable
income of Chinese households has increased due largely to the economic reforms. It also
suggests that Chinese people became less dependent on the government during the reform
era. In other words, Chinese people are now shouldering more responsibilities as
compared to the pre-reform period when most spending was made by the government.

1.2 The Social Impacts of Economic Reforms
China’s economic reforms were first introduced at the end of the 1970s. These
reforms led to the most dramatic social and economic transformations in China’s long
80

% of Central Government Expenditure

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

China
Japan

USA
UK

0.0
1975

1980

1985
Year

1990

1995

Figure 4.3 Government Expenditures on Social Security and Welfare in Four Countries
(% of the central government expenditure)
Source: *: percentages are calculated based on original data from sources.
1. CSYB, various issues; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
2. Japan Statistical Yearbook 1995, p.494-7; and Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 13539. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
3 & 4. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

81

Billions of Chinese yuan

4,500.0
4,000.0
3,500.0
3,000.0
2,500.0
2,000.0
1,500.0
1,000.0
500.0
0.0

Household
consumption
expenditure
General
government
consumption
expenditure

1970 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998
Year
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history. Although they were initially designed just to target the Chinese economy, these
reforms have radically changed Chinese society by transforming “a state-socialist
economic system to a quasi-totalitarian political system.” (Pei 2006: 1) Shortly after the
market mechanism was introduced in rural areas, state enterprises were urged by the
central government to conduct reforms to boost productivity and enterprise profit. These
economic reforms, however, proved to be a double-bladed sword. On one side,
production incentive and profit-making were greatly promoted. Many hardworking
people benefited from this economic transition which rewarded efficiency and
productivity. On the other side, the transition created misery and continuously punished
those who failed to adapt to the competition-intensive society. Many people began to
suffer from the withdrawal of social security and various other welfare benefits that were
previously available to them.

1.2.1 Rural Reforms and the Collapse of the RCMS
In 1979, the Chinese economic reforms were introduced in the rural sector (Oi
1999). The obvious reason for rural reforms, as Jean Oi puts it, was to seek the security of
food production which was severely undermined by the extreme leftist line in the Great
Cultural Revolution (Oi 1996, 1999, Yao 1999). Some studies suggest that the economic
development in Mao’s era was very impressive. Nonetheless, people’s living conditions
could be improved even more if production enthusiasm was not suppressed and the
economy performed its potential (Lardy 1983). The rural reforms were a response to
economic decline and food shortage which were feared to ultimately diminish the
Communist regime’s legitimacy. By the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
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(GPCR), China was still a poor nation despite official statistics showing that the output of
grain, meat, vegetables increased remarkably from 1949 to 1976. For example, the rural
per capita disposable income in 1978 was only 285 yuan which was significantly lower
than the poverty line of 454 yuan given by the World Bank (Yao 1999).
The rural reforms were very successful. The reform proponents abandoned the
previous system of collective production which was organized into Maoist “People’s
Commune” systems. The new household productive responsibility system (HPRS) was
more efficient and incentive-oriented. It gave peasants the opportunity to maximize their
own economic interests through diversifying as well as marketing their production (Oi
1999). The HPRS released the enormous productive energy of Chinese peasants. For
instance, the grain output was merely 305 million tons in 1978. After the implementation
of the HPRS, it grew to 407 million tons in 1984 (Yao 1999). Rural real per capita
income doubled, rising by 14.9 per cent per year (Yao 1999). In the early 1980s, the
income gap between rural and urban residents hardly existed.
The Chinese post-Mao reform was described by most researchers as a gradual
process (Goldstein 1995, Oi 1999, Walder 2002, Pei 2006). This was to a great degree
determined by the relative stagnation of Chinese political changes. However, the Chinese
rural reform was also a radical and abrupt transition (Walder 2002). By the end of 1982,
the rural People’s Communes established in the Mao era were completely disbanded. One
of the world’s most orthodox collective economies was rapidly replaced by a system of
household production which is actually based on the private ownership. Some initial
reform policies were radical even by today’s standards. Land was divided into small
pieces and equally allocated among households. Strict prohibitions against household
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production for commodity and service markets were abandoned. Permits were given to
rural residents to leave home to seek opportunities outside the boundaries of their
collective. Rural entrepreneurships were allowed to run small industrial businesses as a
supplement to grain production. All these policies indicated that the Chinese
government’s reform effort was radical, especially in the economic domain. Radical
reform efforts were even blocked by conservative rural cadres who feared that these
enormous changes would eventually erode their powers and privileges (Zhong 1996,
2003).
The Chinese rural economy was abruptly changed with the introduction of the
market mechanism and the HPRS. Hence, Chinese local governments and officials relied
on economic incentives instead of the old propaganda and mass mobilization to spur
economic growth. Economic reforms generated impressive economic growth and gave
the regime a tremendous boost in legitimacy (Oi 1999). In Chinese society, both the
government and people were then driven by economic reform and material incentives.
China’s development led to the emergence of many social problems in the 1990s
as the consequences of unbalanced economic growth. Regional inequalities became
especially evident at this time (Oi 1999). The income gap between coastal areas and
central and western regions grew to an intolerable level. Peasant protest appeared in
many provinces. The most significant detonator of these social unrests is believed by
most Chinese to be the collapse of the social security and protection system. However, it
seems that nothing can stop China’s ambitious economic reform and the unbalanced
growth which will continue to systematically punish the “have-nots.”
It is well known that the Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) has played
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an important role in the consolidation of rural health service. However, the RCMS
collapsed in the early 1980s due to the widespread market economic reforms. The
reforms initiated a shift of economic activities from the collective to households. The
later adoption of the HPRS radically changed the delivery and financing of rural health
services. The RCMS finally collapsed after experiencing extended financial hardship and
medical personnel shortage. This left the majority of the rural population having to pay
for health care out-of-pocket again.
Prior to the rural economic reforms, the rural health sector was financed by its
respective government, commune, and users charges (see Figure 3.1). Financial resources
of rural health services could be divided into two main categories. One category was
public expenditures, including government subsides and collective contributions. Another
category was fees for services, including medical service fees and profits associated with
drug selling. A study reveals that the government budget for the rural health sector fell
sharply by ten percent during the period 1980-1989 (Zheng and Hillier 1995). As a result,
township health centers and county hospitals had to shoulder the payroll payments and
many of them operated at a deficit. Most village health workers, who were paid by the
former communes or villages, then had to operate with a profit to survive (Liu and Mills
2002).
Rural health facilities began to increasingly rely upon on out-of-pocket payments
by users of medical services. The shrinking financial support from the government led to
the rising of service fees for township and county medical care providers. In 1989, for
example, 20.54 billion yuan ($ 5.55 billion) of health sector income came from patients
directly, while only 11.46 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) came from government budgetary
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allocations (Ho 1995). In some poor counties, user charges account for over 75 percent of
the total revenue of county hospitals and township health centers (Bloom and Gu 1997).
The government grants financed as little as 50 percent of the budgets of preventive
institutes and no more than 25 percent of expenditures of hospitals and health centers
(Bloom and Gu 1997). These changes shifted the financial burden to individual
households who then had to pay for medical services out-of-pocket. Many rural people
who could not afford service fees were then denied access to care by hospitals.
The established rural medical service network was thus weakened or even
completely destroyed due to the widespread market reforms. Many skilled barefoot
doctors in the health service left their positions because of relatively low payments. Since
the co-operative welfare fund was depleted, the RCMS ceased to provide salary for
medical professionals employed at township health centers. Medical care staffs in county
hospitals were urged to negotiate contracts with their hospitals for a payment scheme.
According to the Ministry of Health (MoH) records, the total number of barefoot doctors
working in the countryside decreased from 1.8 million to 1.3 million between 1978 and
1985 (MoH 1987).

1.2.2 Urban Reforms and the Social Security and Welfare
While rural reforms generated tremendous success in promoting production and
people’s living conditions, the urban areas remained stagnant. In 1984, four years after
the rural reforms, China began to restructure the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The
rural reforms created a commercial-oriented production system which became the
foundation for a new market mechanism (Putterman 1992). China’s industrialization had
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been strictly conducted according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrines. The structure of the
Chinese industry was merely a reproduction of the former Soviet Union. In the prereform era, China’s industry was dominated by SOEs of various types (Byrd 1991: 4).
According to official statistics, the public sector accounted for more than 77
percent of gross industrial output in 1978 (Figure 4.6). This ratio was impressive since by
the late 1990s the state sector accounted for only about 30 percent of gross industrial
output and has continued to decline in share since.
One of the most important goals of the urban reforms was to promote enterprise
productivity and profit. First, new managing mechanisms were introduced into the SOEs
to boost profit-making. Before the economic reforms, the majority of the government
revenue came from the contribution of SOEs (Figure 4.7). Throughout the entire 1960s,
the state sector contributed more than 80 percent of the central government’s revenue.
Revenue from the state sector reached its peak in 1961. In that year, approximately 92
percent of the central government’s revenue was collected from the state sector.
However, revenue from the state sector kept declining in share in the following decades.
In 1980, central government revenue collected from the state sector accounted for only
about 80 percent, the lowest percentage since 1959. Due to inefficient management,
overstaffing, and more importantly, the heavy burden of welfare expenditure for workers,
many state enterprises operated at a deficit. The decline of SOEs badly diminished the
central government’s revenue ability. As Figure 4-8 shows, in 1986 the central
government’s revenue was only 20.80 percent of the GDP, the lowest percentage since
1952.
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Figure 4.6 State-Owned Enterprises Industry Output as Percentage of Total Industry
Output, 1952-1999 (%)
Source: CSYB 2000, table 13-3.
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Secondly, hundreds of thousands of redundant workers in the state sector were
laid-off (xiagang). Enterprise reforms led to labor force floating between different
industrial as well as ownership sectors. Since the state sector experienced a sharp decline
in profit-making and many state enterprises failed to provide promised welfare benefits,
many workers began to seek opportunities in collective and private sectors. Figure 4.9
suggests that the ratio of state employees continued increasing until it reached the peak
value of 19.05 percent in 1982. In the middle 1980s, SOEs reforms began to drive urban
workers to pursue employment in collective or private sectors. The share of urban
employed persons in state sectors went down continuously. In 2004, only 8.92 percent of
China’s active workforce was in the state sector (Figure 4.9). The growth of the labor
force in urban private sectors is impressive. When the economic reforms were initiated in
1980, urban private sectors only accounted for less than 0.2 percent of employment. After
SOE reforms dramatically changed the economic system, in 2004 about 3.4 percent of
employees were working in private sectors.
SOE reforms displaced hundreds of thousands of state employees. These laid-offs
workers were either let go with a wholesale one-time compensation or simply sent to reemployment centers without any payment. Before economic reforms, state employees
had a low average wage but enjoyed a high level of welfare provision. However, in the
early 1980s, the urban social benefit system appeared to increasingly impede economic
growth and efficiency. State and collective enterprises that provided the lion share of
urban welfare benefits reduced the welfare burden to lower costs and improve
productivity.
Figure 4.10 indicates that social security and welfare expenditures plunged in the
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late 1970s. Since social security and welfare yielded to enterprise productivity,
government expenditures on welfare dropped from about three percent to only 1.85
percent of the government’s payroll. Throughout the entire 1980s, social security and
welfare expenditures failed to recover to 1970s levels.
Urban reforms in the social policy area involved the redefining of the welfare
responsibilities of three parties – work units, individual employees, and the government.
Since the top goal of urban reforms was to promote enterprise productivity, the financing
of most welfare benefits was given less priority. Welfare responsibility began to
gradually shift away from work units to individual shoulders and the general tax revenue.

1.2.3 Institutional Decentralization and the Rise of Private Businesses
A major change in China’s economic sector that has affected the government’s
social security and welfare expenditures was the decentralization of the public financing
system. In the pre-reform era, the central government collected all revenues and allocated
a portion to provincial governments. Market reforms initiated a fundamental realignment
of the central-local relations in the Chinese government. The most noted reform occurred
in the fiscal administrative system and was aimed at resolving the revenue decline faced
by the central government (Wong 1991). The central government’s budget expenditures
shrank from 50 percent of the total revenue in the 1970s to only 29 percent in 1999
(Figure 4.11). In 2002, nearly 70 percent of the public budget went to sub-national
administrations. Among these funds, approximately 55 percent was distributed to subprovincial levels (World Bank 2003).
The immediate subsequence of the fiscal decentralization was increasing local
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government participation in commercial issues (Duckett 1998, Oi 1992, 1995). The localstate corporatism (LSC) approach argues that China’s tremendous growth of collective
economy is to a great extent due to the local government’s economic incentive (Oi 1992).
China’s system of fiscal contracting, by granting local governments the right to collecting
and retaining the tax revenue, motivated these local officials to promoting business in
their districts (Oi 1992). In other words, market reforms reassigned fiscal power, in the
term of local-central relations, downwards to local governments. In the reform era, each
level of people’s governments was separately responsible for revenue collection.
Revenues of the center, the central government’s tax revenue for example, were primarily
collected by provincial and local level governments. Each government jurisdiction, in
fact, receives its revenues from the jurisdiction below it and from the enterprises it owns
directly (Byrd 1991).
The decentralization of China’s governing system indicates that Chinese society is
becoming more flexible. On one hand, the central government is losing power. On the
other hand, both local governments and commercial sectors are gaining more control over
resources. The CCP has attempted to build broad-based social coalitions to implement its
policies and maintain its governing status. But massive political mobilizations have failed
to strengthen the ruling party’s legitimacy. Instead, as observed in recent years, the CCP
has begun to rely more than ever on economic performance to create a harmonious
society and maintain legitimacy (Zhong 1996, Zhong and Chen 2002).
The growth of private business has also deepened the decentralization of Chinese
society. Private business elites have been gradually deploying their influence on
economic and social affairs. The ruling party has changed its opinion on private business
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and even encouraged capitalists to join the Communist Party. Previously in China, private
business was not a part of the socialism economy. As Young (1995: 25) points out, the
individual economy acted as a “supplement” to the state and collective sectors. Private
businesses, contrary to publicly owned enterprises, are “relatively free-floating.” Under
the market reforms, however, private businesses have grown to an even higher record.
China’s local governments have tried to promote private businesses to resolve some
social problems such as the mass hidden unemployment. However, the private sector,
which has blossomed thanks to the market reforms, has challenged the ideology of state
ownership. The accelerated growth of private businesses began to push the government to
restructure the profitless SOEs.
Economic reforms also lead to some institutional changes that have decentralized
policy-making. Although the central government still enjoys a power monopoly in some
areas, some legislative and judicial changes have taken place. These institutional changes
indicate that the authoritarian system is under transition. In recent years, local people’s
congresses have become an arena in which business elites and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) can voice their opinions. For example, the CCP is still the
dominant power in appointing local high-rank officials, but the party has to rely on local
people’s congresses to carry out its personnel decisions. Often the CCP finds that it has to
compromise with local business elites and their interests because a big portion of
people’s representatives is from private sectors. In both the national and local people’s
congresses, some experts in commercial or technical fields have been appointed to
oversee important issues. The growth of the private sector, increasing of people’s civil
rights, and the rising rule of law all indicate that Chinese society has been diversified in
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resource allocation and policy-making. The 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations provides a
clear example of the increasing mass demand for political reform and freedom.
The growth of China’s middle class is a positive indication of China’s social
transition. With the Chinese economy consistently growing, the middle class is also
expanding its role in Chinese society. Although the middle class in China has not been
clearly defined, it certainly includes new business elites, private small business owners,
as well as upper level employees in foreign or jointed venture companies. The size of the
middle class is growing in relation to the population. It is highly possible that in the near
future this middle class will demand more economic and political freedom. The extensive
conflict between private business elites and the government has been uncovered in recent
years. With several business elites having been executed or having their property
confiscated, this class’s demands for more security and rule of law have increased
correspondingly.

2. The Specific Factors

China’s economic growth in the past two decades has planted seeds of
decentralization and social transitions in Chinese society. Economic growth has been the
most important factor leading to social mobilization and transitions to a more open
society. The Chinese economic development strategy is a gradualist approach. A gradual
development can diminish pressures for political changes by minimizing social conflicts
and lowering reform costs (Pei 2006: 25-27). China’s gradualist approach “has allowed
Chinese leaders fully to exploit the structural advantages provided by favorable initial
conditions.”(Ibid: 26)
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Chinese society has changed enormously in the reform era. Although China’s
leaders can delay political reforms, the society can no longer be ruled in the old ways.
First, the Chinese state structure has been decentralized. The CCP’s monopoly has been
weakened in the reform era. Although the CCP and the state’s privileged position has not
been completely abandoned, the rise of a civil society has placed many constraints on its
behavior. Second, many social movements have eroded the CCP’s legitimacy, causing
the legitimacy to become the highest concern of the ruling party (Zhong 1996, Zhong and
Chen 2002). The Tiananmen crackdown and subsequent democratic movements have
brought democratic values to Chinese society. Recent social crises such as the outburst of
SARS have showed signs of policy transparency in critical policy makings.
Therefore, social security and welfare policy-making, as vital fields influencing
many people’s livelihoods, have received scrutiny from many social groups. The
government and the ruling party can no longer manipulate social security and welfare
policy-making. A decentralized political system has accompanied the Chinese social
transition as a result of the great economic reforms.
Obviously, the central government’s expenditure on social security and welfare
has been determined by a variety of factors. In the early 1950s, the Chinese government
began to install an ambitious socialist welfare system which extended its coverage to the
majority of citizens. However, the 1950s welfare system was gradually repealed due to
the lack of funds and institutional support. For example, the revoking of the People’s
Commune and the vanishing of communal funds led to the collapse of the RCMS.
Generally, poor countries cannot afford a well-funded comprehensive welfare
system. Socialist states tend to provide generous welfare schemes which are hardly
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affordable due to their usually laggard economies. As discussed in previous sections, the
Chinese welfare state has been refurnished since the economic reforms launched in the
early 1980s. The reforms have deeply changed the Chinese state and society. In the
reform era, decision-making has been decentralized. Institutional transitions making
China more capitalist have been undertaken in both economic and social areas. Thus, the
socialist ideology of building an egalitarian society has continually faded away as
capitalist values have gradually stepped in.
In the remaining part of this chapter, I will orderly discuss the variables
representing institutional transitions. Four variables, Industrialization, SOE reforms,
Urbanization, and Decentralization each represents a substantial institutional transition
that has shaped the Chinese welfare state.

2.1 Industrialization
“Logic of industrialism” theorists have claimed that industrialization led to the the
expansion of welfare state (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Pryor 1968,
Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 1975). States begin to play a more important role (active or
passive) when industrialization destroys traditional social networks on which people
depend during difficult times. The “logic of industrialism” thesis placed less emphasis on
the causal relationship than the concomitant progress of industrialization and welfare
state expansion. It is easy to predict that a state will spend more on social security and
welfare if its industrialization reaches a certain degree. However, it is hard to say whether
a state will spend more or less with industrialization continuously making progress.
The unique experience of China’s industrialization makes it a good example for
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examining the correlation of industrialization and welfare expenditure. Several
remarkable issues divide the brief history of China’s industrialization into three segments.
First, from 1950 to 1960 the Chinese leadership strictly followed Marxist-Leninist
doctrine in creating a socialist industrial system with an overwhelming emphasis being
placed on heavy industry. The primary goal was to rapidly promote the country from an
agrarian society to an industrialized one. In 1952, industrial output accounted for 17.64
percent of GDP. It reached 39 percent in 1960 (Figure 4.12). Second, from 1961 to 1978
this rapid industrialization was disrupted because radical leftists achieved dominancy in
politics. The whole country was in chaos due to the irrational development plan
attempted in the Great Leap Forward Movement (GLF, 1958-63) and the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR, 1966-76). Figure 4.12 shows the industry output
plunged in the early 1960s. Industrial output further declined from 39 percent of GDP in
1960 to only 29.64 percent in 1961. This 10 percent decrease in just one year is anything
but normal. Another industrial recession happened in the very beginning of the GPCR.
During the period from 1966 to 1968, industrial output shrank from 34.72 percent of
GDP to 28.45 (Figure 4.12). Third, since 1979, economic reforms were introduced first in
rural and then in urban areas. SOEs productivity was greatly promoted. In 2004, the
industrial output reached 45.89 percent of GDP (Figure 4.12).
Figure 4.13 reflects a negative relation between welfare expenditure and
industrialization. This negative relationship is reinforced when examining welfare
expenditure on industrialization (Equation 4.1). Welfare expenditure and industrialization
are both measured as a percentage of GDP for the observation year. Therefore, the
Chinese government has actually under-spent on social security and welfare when
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50.0

considering the share of industrial output rising in GDP. This is contradictory to the
“logic of industrialism” thesis which asserts a positive relationship between welfare
expenditure and industrialization.

WelfareExp = 0.819 − 0.011Industrialization)
(.130) (.003)

Equation 4.1

Entries in parenthesis are standardized errors.
Several facts can explain the under-spending. First, the Chinese government
overspent on welfare during its early years. Therefore, the under-spending in late years is
not a result of industrialization but rather the unavoidable adjustment of government
budgetary policy. Shortly after the Communist takeover, the government promulgated the
LIR in 1951. Workers’ social rights and benefits were fully protected in the LIR and its
later revised versions. The socialist ideology underling social security and welfare also
spurred the government to overspend on welfare schemes, as the newborn regime viewed
its emphasis on people’s welfare as an indication of the superiority of socialism. Second,
during the GLF and GPCR, millions of urban youngsters were encouraged to seek jobs in
rural areas. The urban population stagnated and even declined in some years (Figure
4.14). Since welfare spending was heavier on urbanities as compared to rural residents,
welfare expenditure was able to decline despite increasing industrialization. Third, in the
early 1960s, the central government shifted the responsibility of financing welfare to state
enterprises (Chow 1988). The government’s expenditure on social security and welfare
decline accordingly.
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Source: CSYB: various issues.
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2.2 SOE reforms
SOE reforms were initiated in 1984. These reforms cut welfare benefits in various
ways. After enterprise reforms were widely implemented in the late 1980s, SOEsprovided welfare benefits including housing allowances, health insurance, and food
stamps were either completely revoked or reduced. First, lifelong employment was
repealed. SOEs began to promote productivity at the cost of the workers’ job security and
welfare benefits. Second, after the introduction of the new contractual labor system, SOE
managers received more autonomy in firing employees. Employment in the state sector
declined sharply in the 1990s. Figure 4.15 shows that the SOE workforce plunged from
110 million in 1997 to 67 million in 2004, a 50 percent decrease in only six years.
Thirdly, in contrast to the declining employment in state or collective enterprises, the
workforce in private sectors and individual firms increased dramatically (see Figure 4.9).
Due to the tempting cash income and flexible working schedule, many state-sector
employees sought jobs in the private sector. Self-employed and private enterprise
workers are not covered by general revenue financed social security schemes such as the
LRS or GRS. Although they are still allowed to receive social welfare benefits or lowincome subsidies (as long as they hold urban residence), the financial burden they place
on the government is quite low when compared to that of state or collective employees.
Self-employed persons and private-sector employees have developed a high level of selfreliance. Their pensions, housing, and health insurance are either paid out of their own
pockets or from commercial funds.
Figure 4.16 shows that a slightly negative relationship exists between state-sector
employment and welfare expenditure. This means that as employees in state sectors
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Figure 4.15 State-Owned Enterprises Workforce, 1950-2005 (10,000 persons)
Source: CSYB: various issues.
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Figure 4.16 Welfare Expenditure and State-Sector Employees, 1950-1987 (% of GDP for
welfare expenditure, % of total employees for state-sector employees)
Source: CSYB: various issues.
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have decreased over time, government welfare expenditure has increased very slightly. A
negative coefficient for the indicator for the state-sector employment reinforces the
negative relationship (Equation 4-2). But the p value is 0.238 which is not statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. There must be some other hidden factors playing.
WelfareExp = 0.557 − 0.009StateEmployment
(.119) (.008)

Equation 4.2

Entries in parenthesis are standardized errors.

2.3 Urbanization
As China has experienced rapid industrialization since 1950, the urbanization rate
has correspondingly increased. In 1949, when the PRC was established, the urban
population accounted for only 10.64 percent of the total population. After ten years of
rapid industrialization, the urbanization rate reached 19.75 percent in 1975. However, the
Chinese urbanization did not increase consistently. There were declines and rebounds in
the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 4.17 indicates that the urbanization rate declined during the
time from 1962 to 1978 during which the Chinese people suffered from domestic chaos
created by the GLF and GPCR. The urbanization rate remained stagnate at around 17
percent between 1965 and 1978.
The stagnation of urbanization in the 1970s was the result of the Chinese
government’s policy of encouraging urban young intellectuals to receive re-education in
rural areas. Hundreds of thousands of urbanities were sent to remote rural areas to labor
or to be “re-educated”. This was called the “Down to the Countryside” (shangshan
xiaxiang) movement which was believed to be an efficient way of teaching young
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intellectuals to strictly follow the Party’s mass line route 11 (qunzhong luxian). Those
urban young intellectuals that went to rural areas were called intellectual youngsters
(zhishi qinnian). After the GPCR was ended in 1976, the movement of driving urban
youngsters to rural areas was gradually revoked. Many intellectual youngsters returned to
the cities from which they were originally dispatched.
The urbanization rate has grown consistently since 1979. In 1996, the urban
population accounted for about thirty percent of the total population. It took only seven
more years for the urbanization rate to reach forty percent. In 2004, the urbanization rate
reached 41.76 percent, the peak value that has never been seen before in Chinese history.
Figure 4.18 shows a slightly negative relationship between welfare expenditure and
urbanization. When examining the correlation of welfare expenditure and urbanization, a
negative relationship is found (Equation 4.3). The negative coefficient indicates that the
increase in the urbanization rate does not lead the Chinese government to
correspondingly raise welfare spending. Although the urban population has grown
significantly since 1980 and welfare benefits for urbanities have been a major concern of
the Chinese government, welfare spending has not correspondingly increased with
urbanization.

WelfareExp = 0.557 − 0.012Urbanization
(.076) (.003)

Equation 4.3

Entries in parenthesis are standardized errors.

11

The Mass line is the political and organizational method developed by Mao Zedong and the CCP during
the Chinese revolution.

112

Welfare Expenditure as % of GDP
1.2

Observed
Linear

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
10.0

20.0
30.0
40.0
Urban Population as % of Total Population

Figure 4.18 Welfare Expenditure and Urbanization, 1949-2004
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2.4 Decentralization
Institutional settings have been well known for affecting welfare expenditures.
Policy making is always the key to understanding the evolution of the welfare state
(Korpi 1989, Palme 1990, Kangas 1991). In democratic countries, for example, the power
structure determines welfare expenditure (Cameron 1978, Stephens 1979, Castles 1982,
Hicks and Swank 1984, Myles 1984). Resources are allocated by legislation and political
struggle is the only way to achieve a commonly agreed upon welfare agenda or income
distribution plan. Generally, a leftist government tends to spend more revenue on social
security and favor re-distributive schemes while a conservative government prefers low
taxes and pursues active reemployment. A centrally planned economic entity has been
known for generous welfare spending because of the working-class dominancy. But the
high welfare expenditure in socialist states is more a result of ideology than of political
struggles or institutional settings. What if a socialist state that is undergoing capitalistlike transitions to a market economy? Do policy making and institutional change matter
to China’s welfare expenditure?
The Chinese welfare state has been a gradually evolving entity. Decentralization
has played a significant role in China’s transition to a market economy. The first
decentralization effort of the Chinese economy was made by Mao Tse-Tung. In 1956, he
condemned the over-centralization in economic planning and management and called for
study and discussion of the relationship between central and local authority (Lardy 1975).
Thereafter, decentralization reforms encompassed the areas of industrial, commercial and
financial management. Local revenue shares increased sharply from only 19.59 percent in
1958 to 75.62 percent in 1959 (Figure 4.19).
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In the pre-reform era, the central government received a high portion of the
national income 12 and played a determining role in welfare policy making. For example,
the central government’s budgetary revenue share was 84.48 percent of GDP in 1978.
After ten years of economic reforms, local governments were given more autonomy in
resource allocation and revenue detaining. Hence, financial resources controlled by the
central government decreased. In 1988, the central budgetary revenue share declined
sharply to only 67.13 percent of GDP (see Figure 4.8). The budgetary revenue ratio of
local to central changed dramatically due to the economic reforms.
Table 4.4 shows that the share of budgetary local revenue reached its peak in
1975. Since the economic reforms were introduced in 1980, the share of budgetary local
revenue has been consistently declining. In 1995, the budgetary local revenue share was
91.68, lower than the central budgetary revenue for the first time since 1959.
The budgetary local revenue share remained at over 60 percent of the total
budgetary revenue during the entire 1960s and 1970s (see Figure 4.19). This share
declined visibly in the early 1980s. In 1984, the budgetary local revenue accounted for
only 59.49 percent of the total budgetary revenue, the lowest percentage since 1959.
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, however, the budgetary local revenue share
increased at a steady rate. This was the start-up period for the SOE reforms. The central
government gave up some financial constraints it previously used to yoke local
governments. Instead of being commanded to strictly follow the central government’s
plan, the local governments were encouraged to pursue developmental agendas of their
12

The Chinese budget system is a complicated issue. Extra-budgetary revenue for both central and local
governments has been a common phenomenon. In this dissertation the regular budget plus the extra-budget
are used as the main indicator.
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Table 4.4 Local and Central Shares of Budgetary Revenue, 1953-2004 (100 million yuan)
Year
1953
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2004

Local Revenue
36.22
55.83
429.49
317.25
479.95
718.98
875.48
1235.19
1944.68
2985.58
6406.06
11893.37

Central Revenue

Local/Central (%)*

177.02
193.44
142.80
156.07
182.95
96.63
284.45
769.63
992.42
3256.62
6989.17
14503.10

20.46
28.86
300.76
203.27
262.34
744.05
307.78
160.49
195.95
91.68
91.66
82.01

Source: CSYB: various issues
*
The local government’ revenue share is in the percentage of the central government
revenue.
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own. As Oi (1992, 1995) puts it, the local incentive was the key of China’s economic
takeoff. Local governments were allowed to detain a bigger portion of tax income for
their economic development. Institutional reforms in 1980 set the tone for increasing
local self-reliance in public finance. The reforms were motivated by a commitment to
greater decentralization of decision-making, the need to shed expenditure responsibilities
given reduced central fiscal resources, and the desire of central leaders to secure the
political support of provincial officials by increasing local autonomy (Wong 1994).
Therefore, the budgetary revenue share of the central government declined sharply in the
late 1980s.
The extra-budgetary revenue, however, is very unique in China’s economic
development. It reflects the desire for flexibility that the Chinese government has been
eagerly pursuing. Figure 4.20 shows the Chinese government’s extra-budgetary revenues
from 1952 to 2004. Extra-budgetary revenue consists of tax surcharges and user fees
levied by the central and local government’s agencies as well as earnings from SOEs.
The extra-budgetary local revenues are not subject to sharing with the central government
but the budgetary revenues are. Up to 1994, all budgetary revenues except custom’s
duties were collected by local government.
In 1994, however, a new policy towards tax revenue was put into effect by the
central government. The tax system is at the core of central-local relations. In the prereform economy, resource allocation was directed by the central authority and
expenditures on economic constructions were primarily shouldered by the central
government. The central budget also accounted for all the costs of national defense and
external expenditures. In contrast, local governments were assigned the responsibility for
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managing social services and governmental administration. In the early 1980s, market
reforms put into place the new fiscal system known for “eating from separate kitchens.”
This new policy gave local governments, especially the provincial governments, the
incentives to retain a relatively bigger portion of extra-budgetary revenues. Therefore,
extra-budgetary revenues increased rapidly throughout the 1980s (see Figure 4.20).
The 1994 tax reform, however, allocated a bigger portion of tax income to the
central government. Figure 4.20 indicates that the extra-budgetary local revenue share
plunged in the middle 1990s. Since 1995, the budgetary local revenue share accounts for
about 50 percent of the total budgetary revenue (see Figure 2.19).
The central government’s share of extra-budgetary revenue has decrease sharply
since 1986. Table 4.5 suggests that the central government received 41.2 percent of the
total extra-budgetary revenue in 1986. The share, however, continuously decreased in the
following years. By 2003, the central government only received 8.3 percent of the extrabudgetary revenue.
When compiling both the budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues, it was found
that the local revenue began to surpass the central revenue since 1958 (Figure 4.21).
Between 1953 and 1994, the difference between local and central revenue grew
continuously (Figure 4.22). The new tax policy adopted in 1994 caused a sharp decline in
the local revenue. Figure 4.22 indicates that the local revenue plunged in 1994. However,
central governments’ share of revenue has been consistently growing over time. This is a
strong indicator for China’s fiscal decentralization.
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Figure 4.20 Chinese Government’s Extra-budgetary Revenues (in million yuan)
Source: CSYB, various issues.
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Table 4.5 Chinese Government’s Budgetary and Extra-budgetary Revenue in Selected
Years (in million yuan)
Year

Central Gov.
Revenue

Local Gov.
Revenue

1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

193.44
142.80
156.07
182.95
96.63
284.45
311.07
346.84
490.01
665.47
769.63
778.42
736.29
774.76
822.52
992.42
938.25
979.51
957.51
2906.50
3256.62
3661.07
4226.92
4892.00
5849.21
6989.17
8582.74
10388.64
11865.27

55.83
429.49
317.25
479.95
718.98
875.48
864.72
865.49
876.94
977.39
1235.19
1343.59
1463.06
1582.48
1842.38
1944.68
2211.23
2503.86
3391.44
2311.60
2985.58
3746.92
4424.22
4983.95
5594.87
6406.06
7803.30
8515.00
9849.98

Source: CSYB, various issues.
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ExtraBudgetary
Revenue
17.02
117.78
75.56
100.94
251.48
557.40
601.07
802.74
967.68
1188.48
1530.03
1737.31
2028.80
2360.77
2658.83
2708.64
3243.30
3854.92
1432.54
1862.53
2406.50
3893.34
2826.00
3082.29
3385.17
3826.43
4300.00
4479.00
4566.80

Central Gov. Share of
Extra-Budgetary
Revenue (%)
41.2
40.8
38.4
40.3
39.6
42.6
44.3
17.2
15.2
13.2
24.3
5.1
5.3
6.8
6.5
8.1
9.8
8.3
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Figure 4.21 Budgetary and Extra-budgetary Government Revenue, 1953-2003 (in million
yuan)
Source: CSYB, various issues.
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Figure 4.22 The Difference Between Local Revenue and Central Revenue, 1953-2003 (in
million yuan)
Source: CSYB, various issues.
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3. Conclusion

This chapter discusses the impacts that institutional changes have placed on the
Chinese welfare state. The government has played an active role in welfare policy
making. Before the market reforms, the central government determined the pace of
economic development. Under the command economic system, the central government
controlled material and fiscal resources. Social security and welfare schemes were by and
large decided by the central government. The socialist ideology emphasizes the role of
workers. Hence, protecting workers’ political and social rights is one of the supreme
goals of socialist regimes. Socialist states tend to install comprehensive and generous
welfare schemes that extend coverage to all the working population. The Chinese welfare
state has been no exception. Due to the active role of state, the social security and welfare
schemes introduced in the early 1950s did not even take into account the revenue
shortage. Heavy financial burdens finally forced the central government to shift such
welfare responsibilities as medical service and insurance to enterprises.
The economic reforms brought multiple institutional changes to Chinese society.
The reforms began with the implementation of market mechanisms in the Lenin Stalinist
system. The rural economy was radically restructured to spur peasants’ productive
incentives. Because of their flexibility and efficiency, private firms gradually triumphed
in the race with collective or state-owned enterprises. In the early 1980s, small businesses
such as TVEs in rural areas and individual firms (geti hu) in cities gradually replaced
SOEs in the service and retail sector. Market reforms were introduced in SOEs to
promote productivity. Many welfare benefits previously enjoyed by workers at low or no
costs were then made available only to a small portion of the working population and
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even then usually associated with high costs.
Meanwhile, local governments gain more freedom in economic affairs. In the
reform era, the fiscal system becomes more decentralized. Enterprises and local
authorities gain the ability to detain a significant amount of profit or revenue. But
relatively less government money was given to the provision of social security and
welfare. Local governments have been actively involving in economic affairs since the
market reforms were initiated. Since a higher priority was place on economic
development, welfare programs suffered from a shortage of investment.
Although China has experienced rapid industrialization in the past few decades,
the state’s welfare expenditure grows very slowly. Industrial employment and urban
population have increased continuously. In Western countries on the other hand, welfare
expenditures grew concomitantly during their rapid industrialization. The Chinese
welfare state, however, did not develop through industrialization alone. In addition to
industrialization, Chinese society has also been gradually urbanized. Hundreds of
thousands of jobless peasants began to seek jobs in cities. A heavy urban population has
always been associated with soaring welfare expenditure. In China’s case, however,
welfare expenditure fails to keep pace with urbanization. In recent years, this has led to
some serious consequences. Many urban people, most of them rural immigrants or
floating peasant workers, do not have any access to any form of social security or
welfare.
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CHAPTER 5:
Institutional Changes and Welfare Benefits: Hypotheses and Evidences

Institutional changes have radically restructured Chinese economy and society. The wellbeing of the Chinese people has also been directly influenced. In urban areas, many
people formerly worked for state enterprises are laid off during enterprise reforms. These
people are deprived of access to publicly financed welfare schemes. People who seek job
in private sectors have voluntarily given up welfare benefits in exchange for high cash
income. In rural areas, people have less control over their careers. Income from
cultivating land can barely sustain their living. When seeking job in non-agricultural
sectors, however, they receive no compensation or training. Rural people are moving to
cities to seek job opportunities. Floating peasant workers become a new phenomenon in
Chinese society.
Economic reforms have been so far the most significant institutional changes that
affect the Chinese welfare state. Other institutional changes, as discussed in previous
chapters, have been closely related to economic reforms. For example, decentralization
did not start until economic reforms were put in practice to encouraging local incentive.
Enterprise reforms which restructured SOEs are part of the economic reforms. In this
chapter, I will demonstrate the impacts that institutional changes have placed on the way
Chinese people receive welfare benefits. Through the study of the micro perspectives 13 of
the Chinese welfare state, I will discuss how economic reforms have influenced the

13

In contrast to macro studies which are always conducted with statistical data, micro perspectives refer to
the study based on survey, or data collected at individual or household level.
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distribution of welfare benefits among Chinese individuals and households. Empirical
evidences are used to testify the impacts of China’s multiple transitions on people’s wellbeing as well as the welfare system.
In Chapter IV I have demonstrated that four major factors have influenced
China’s welfare spending. They are industrialization, SOE reforms, urbanization, and
decentralization. The exploration of statistical data suggests that all of them have been
negatively related to the central government’s expenditure on welfare. In this chapter, I
will use data from 1988 and 1995 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) to further
discover the impacts that these factors have placed on Chinese people’s welfare benefits.
The multiple regression statistical method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is used
to testify the arguments I have made in Chapter IV. The statistical method will eventually
lead to the compilation of five multiple regression models. In four of them – Model I
through Model IV – I test individually the institutional change variables: Industrialization,
SOE reforms, Urbanization, and Decentralization. I discuss the statistical impacts of each
variable in the respective regression model. Finally, in the full model I evaluate the joint
impacts that these four institutional change variables have had on the Chinese welfare
state and people’s well-being.

1. Data

This dissertation is conducted by empirically modeling welfare benefit using data
from Chinese Household Income Projects (CHIP) 1988 (Griffin and Zhao) and 1995
(Riskin, Zhao, and Li). The CHIP 1988 and 1995 were conducted to measure and
estimate the income distribution in both rural and urban areas of the People’s Republic of
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China. Both household and individual were units of analysis. Items investigated included
the income of household or individual, welfare benefits provided by the state, work units,
or collective funds, and all types and values of subsidies. Households also reported on
their expenditures on food, housing, and medical services.
Since this dissertation examines whether China’s transitions are a function of the
welfare benefit discrepancy in the reform era, I limit my examination to individual and
household income in the form of welfare benefit. The dependent variable reflects the
welfare benefits in cash value received by citizens. Components of the welfare benefits
are all calculated in cash at the current market value. To construct the dependent variable,
I added each welfare benefit received by a person to achieve the total value in that year.
The descriptive analyses are based on data collected at both individual and
household levels. These data enable me to do meaningful comparisons of China’s rural
and urban individuals and households in terms of welfare benefit. Since the data consist
of measures from both 1988 and 1995, I can also examine the discrepancy of welfare
benefit through time.
The regression analyses (the models), however, are based solely on the 1995
CHIP Urban Individual (CHIPUI) dataset. Due to the lack of required variables, the 1988
CHIP dataset is not used in the regression analyses. The 1995 CHIPUI dataset is a subset
of the 1995 CHIP data. It was collected at the urban individual level. The dataset
comprises 21,698 urban individuals. Among the interviewed individuals, however, only
13,135 cases are valid.

128

2. Descriptive Analyses

2.1 Falling Welfare Coverage
While in the 1960s and 1970s China performed well on welfare provision, in the
1980s it faltered, and in the 1990s it slipped still further. China’s increasingly weak
performance is argued to reflect system-wide weaknesses in the welfare regime (Liu
2002). For example, the cost of health service has grown rapidly in recent years, deterring
use of health services, and put households who do use services at financial risk (Jalan and
Ravallion 1999). The rise in the cost of care has coincided with falling health insurance
coverage. Health insurance has all but disappeared in rural areas, and is under good deal
of strain in urban areas.
In the pre-reform era, peasants working for people’s communes enjoyed a variety
of collective welfare benefits (Bloom and Gu 1997). Economic reforms destroyed the
financial and organizational channels through which rural people drew welfare benefits.
The door of collective welfare funds 14 was actually shut down to Chinese peasants.
In1988, 98 percent of rural households received nothing from collective welfare funds
(Table 5.1). Among the seventeen five-guarantees households, none reported receiving
collective welfare benefits in 1988 (Table 5.2).
The declining coverage of health insurance is one of the most dramatic welfare
retrenches in China. Under China’s pre-reform planned economy, almost all citizens were
covered by some form of health insurance. Agricultural workers were covered by the old
RCMS, SOE workers were covered by the LIS, and civil servants and other government
14

Collective welfare funds are publicly financed and managed programs that provide regular, which are
always basic or minimum, aids to needy households.
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Table 5.1 Rural Households Received Collective Welfare in 1988 and 1995 (% of total)
Welfare Benefits from Collective
Welfare Fund (yuan)
0
1~100
101~200
201~300
301~400
401~500
>500
Mean (yuan)

1988

1995

98.0
1.0
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.3
4.64
N=10258

98.2
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.4
10.98
N=7998

Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995

Table 5.2 Rural Household Type and the Distribution of Collective Welfare in 1988
Receive
Collective
Welfare

Do Not Receive
Collective
Welfare

% Receive
Collective Welfare

Five-guarantees
Household

0

17

0

Township or Village
Cadre Household

37

717

4.9

Worker/employee
Household

9

453

1.9

3

427

0.7

153

8347

1.8

202

9961

-

Household type

Household with
Permanent Residence in A
City or Town
Other
Total
Source: CHIP 1988
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workers were covered by the GIS. There were some gaps in coverage. For example, not
all urban welfare schemes covered dependents. But the gaps were relatively small.
During the 1970s the RCMS covered an estimate 90 percent of the rural population.
China’s near-universal coverage is thought to have been one critical reason for its
spectacular success in improving health outcomes during the 1970s (Sidel 1993).
China’s economic transitions from the 1980s onwards brought radical reductions
in the health insurance coverage. The decollectivization of agriculture resulted in almost
the total collapse of the RCMS. By 1993 less than ten percent of the rural population had
health insurance (World Bank 2005b). Other welfare benefits were also scissored in the
reform era. Table 5.3 suggests that in 1988 approximately 57.6 percent of rural workers
in state sectors received a pension. By 1995 rural pensioners in state sectors dropped to
55.6 percent. Dramatic declines also happened in rural collective and private sectors.
From 1988 to 1995, pensioners in collective and private sectors dropped 15.1 and 3.7
percent respectively. In urban areas, enterprise reforms laid off hundreds of thousand
state employees. Their health insurance that previously financed by their work units were
either completely revoked or left in poor condition. By 1995 more than forty percent of
urban population paid health insurance premiums or medical costs out of their own
pockets (Table 5.4). Only 51.3 percent of urban population was covered by public health
services provided by the state or the work unit.

2.2 Work Unit-Based Welfare Benefits
In the pre-reform era, the majority of urban workers received welfare benefits
from their work units. The work unit became one of the most referred approaches for the
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Table 5.3 Rural Pensioners in Different Ownership Sectors, 1988 & 1995 (% of the 60+
population within the ownership sector)
Ownership Sector
State-owned enterprise or
institution

1988

1995

Difference

57.6

55.6

-2.0

21.4

6.3

-15.1

Private or individual
enterprise

3.7

0

-3.7

Farming

2.5

0.1

-2.4

Collective

Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995

Table 5.4 Health Insurance in Urban Areas, 1995
Health Insurance Type
Through Public Health
Service Provided by State
or the Work Unit
Through Commercial
Medical Insurance
Entirely Self-financed
Other
Total

Frequency

Percent

11121

51.3

2221

10.2

6530

30.1

1822

8.4

21694

100

Source: CHIP 1995
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research of the welfare state with the Chinese characteristics (Chan and Chow 1992).
Welfare benefits provided by the work unit included health insurance, pension, maternity
compensation, and industrial injury care and compensation. Hardship allowances and
food subsidies were regular benefits associated with employment. Economic reforms
introduced in the mid-1980s brought dramatic changes to the way state employees
received welfare benefits from the state or the work unit.
First, many state employees were laid off. Enterprise reforms were introduced in
1984. SOEs were asked by the government to cutting loss-making or less profitable
projects. Managers were given more autonomy to lay off “redundant workers.” In 1988
state sectors employed only 22.2 percent of the total working population (Table 5.5). In
1995 the workforce in state sectors further decreased to 18.9 percent. In contrast, the
workforce in private and Sino-foreign joint enterprises grew twice and trice respectively.
Secondly, SOEs made very limit progress on the welfare support for the most
disadvantaged groups. SOE employees receiving hardship allowances in various kinds
grew only 0.1 point from 1988 to 1995 (Table 5.6). Although hundreds of thousand
employees were laid off to increase productivity, SOEs still failed to provide hardship
subsidies to the needy employees. By contrast poor families in private sectors were given
more welfare relief. In 1995 1.9 percent of employees in private sectors were given
hardship allowances. The increase was very impressive because private sectors accounted
for only 1.1 percent of the total workforce.
Thirdly, many employees in state sectors lost their medical care benefits during
the SOE reforms. SOEs pursued profit at the cost of employees’ job security and welfare
benefit. By 1995 only 58.9 percent of state employees reported receiving medical care
133

Table 5.5 Ownership Sector of Primary Workplace for Urban Residents, 1988 and 1995
(%)
Ownership Sector of
Workplace
State-owned, at Center or
Province (or autonomous
region) or Municipality Level

1988

1995

22.2

18.9

33.7

48.0

0.6

1.1

0.2
0.03

0.7
0.1

Collective
Private or Individual-owned
Sino-foreign Joint Venture
Foreign-owned
Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995.

Table 5.6 Hardship Allowance in Different Ownership Sectors, 1988 & 1995 (%)
Ownership Sector
State-owned, at Center or
Provincial (or autonomous region)
or Municipal Level

1988

1995

Difference

0.6*

0.7

+0.1

0.8

0.6

-0.2

0.5

1.9

+1.4

-

-

-

Collective
Private or Individual-owned
Sino-foreign Joint Venture
Foreign-owned

Source: CHIP 1988 & 1995.
* percents are calculated within each ownership category.
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benefits from the state (Table 5.7). Under the planned economic system, however, health
services were provided to virtually all urban workers free of charge (Wu 1997).
Employees of private enterprises received less medical care benefits from the state. Only
1.9 percent of investigated workers in private enterprises received medical care benefits
in 1995. The medical benefit gaps between ownership sectors were huge.
In Table 5.7, employees of state sectors received an average of 433 yuan medical
subsidies from state while employees of private enterprises received only five yuan.
Although state sectors had diminished welfare benefits to their employees, they were by
1995 the best providers of medical care benefits. The Sino-foreign joint enterprise, a
growing economic sector in China, was outstanding in welfare provision to the
employees. In 1995 it provided the most generous medical care benefits in private sectors.
About 34.5 percent of employees in Sino-foreign joint enterprises received medical care
benefits. The average amount they received was 123 yuan, the highest in private sectors.

3. Research Hypotheses

In Chapter IV I have demonstrated that the Chinese welfare policy-making has
been under tight control of the central government. Employees in state sectors receive
better welfare coverage in contrast with those in private or collective sectors. Chinese
social security schemes have been mostly created by the central government and financed
by the general revenue or enterprise-retained profit. Such welfare benefits as housing
allowances, child care subsidies, and unemployment compensations (available since
1993), are partly or completely provided by work units. Urban people employed in state
sectors are usually given the access to more welfare schemes. Subsidies they gain from
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Table 5.7 Urban Individuals from Different Ownership Sectors Receiving Medical Care
Benefits from State in 1995
Ownership sector
State-owned at Central or
Provincial Level
Local Publicly-owned
Urban Collective
Township and Village
Enterprise
Private Enterprise
Self-employed
Business/Individual
Enterprise
Sino-foreign Joint Venture
Foreign-owned

Mean (yuan)*

Percent (%)!

N#

433

58.9

4096

385

54.3

8039

229

41.9

2394

294

50.0

8

5

1.9

53

13

2.6

193

123

34.5

145

33

12.5

16

Source: CHIP 1995.
Note: * mean values for each category.
! the portion of investigated persons in each category that receive medical subsidies from
state.
# the number of persons investigated in each category.
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work units are also higher in market value than those received by employees in non-state
sectors.
Previous sections of this chapter have discussed welfare benefit differences between
the urban and rural population. Economic reforms from the 1980s onward have dramatically
changed the way the Chinese people receive welfare benefits from the state. Rural people are
the primary victims of economic reforms and the associated institutional transitions. The
urban working population, however, have been influenced by economic reforms differently.
First, many state employees still enjoy full welfare benefits. The laid-off workers, however,
were denied of access to public welfare schemes, namely the LIS or GIS. They were
unemployed or self-employed after being laid off from state sectors. Second, the rapid
growth of private sectors, especially private enterprises and individual firms, provided a new
career channel for urban residents. Employment in private sectors had expanded at an
accelerative speed since enterprise reforms were widely introduced in SOEs.

3.1 Variables and Coding
In the regression models, the independent variable Place of Work (state or nonstate) is equivalent to SOE reforms. I measure this variable by compiling whether a
person is employed in non-state sectors. A person who is employed in non-state is coded
as 1 and 0 for employees in state-owned organizations at central or provincial level.
The independent variable Industry or Non-industry is equivalent to
industrialization. This variable is measured by compiling whether a person is employed
in such traditional industrial sectors as heavy or light industry, mining, construction,
transportation, or commercial material supply. A person who is employed in these areas
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is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.
In the regression models, Primary Income Source represents urbanization. The
measure of Primary Income Source is complicated. It is the count of urban residents who
draw primary income from agriculture sectors. Usually, urbanization means the size of
urban population. The 1995 CHIPUI, however, does not directly report the rate of
urbanization. An indirect measure is used to represent this variable. In the dataset, a
variable measuring an individual’s economic sector of primary job can be used to
compile the urbanization rate. Although a person lives in urban areas, his or her primary
job may be in agricultural sectors. Welfare benefits for employees in agricultural sectors
are different from those in non-agricultural sectors. Hence, an urban resident reports
working in non-agricultural sectors is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.
The last independent variable Source for Welfare Benefit is equivalent to
decentralization. This variable is measured by compiling whether a person receives health
protection from state or public sources. A person whose health care is not covered by the
state or the work unit at central or provincial level is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Since
health care is one of the most important parts of welfare benefits available to the Chinese
people, the examination of health care can reflect the situation of a person’s well-being.
Receiving health care services from non-state or public sources reflects the institutional
decentralization of the welfare benefit distribution.

3.2 Welfare Benefit
Research on the Chinese welfare state has taken the welfare benefits received by
people as the most important object. In this dissertation, the market value of the welfare
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benefits provided by state or the work unit is the sole dependent variable. As I have
discussed in previous chapters, the government and the work unit monopolized welfare
provision in the pre-reform era. Economic reforms radically changed the distribution of
welfare benefits. In this study, the welfare benefit is measured with cash at market value.
Three parts are included:
1, state-paid medical care benefits;
2, wages when “waiting for job”, or unemployment compensations;
3, other allowances and subsidies:
a, housing subsidies
b, medical subsidies
c, child care subsidies
d, regional subsidies (benefits for people working in remote or poor areas)

3.3 Place of work (state or non-state)
This is the measure for the impacts of SOE reforms. Earlier research has indicated
that economic reforms affect the welfare distribution and people’s welfare benefits
(Wong 1992, 1998, Chen 2002). Moreover, existing research has established that work
unit is an adequate channel in measuring the discrepancy of people’s welfare benefits
(Chan and Chow 1992). Previous discussions in this study have revealed that the
changing characteristics of the Chinese welfare state are associated with the multiple
transitions started in the early 1980s (Li 2004). Accordingly, I expect that enterprise
reforms, the most important part of the Chinese economic reforms in urban areas, will be
a function of the welfare discrepancy between different ownership sectors. I hypothesize
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that employees in non-state sectors receive less amount of welfare benefits from state or
work unit than people employed in state sectors. Hence,
H1: A person who is employed in non-state sectors will be more likely to receive
less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than people who are employed in
state sectors.
The testing of this hypothesis will lead me to find out the impacts that SOE
reforms have placed on the distribution of welfare benefits among urban residents. In the
pre-reform era, the welfare benefit distribution was very even in urban areas. A person
employed in state sectors received the same package of social security and welfare
benefits as people in collective sectors. However, the welfare benefit discrepancy began
to grow in the reform era. Enterprise reforms laid off hundreds of thousand state
employees. Some of the laid-off workers went to private sectors. Their welfare benefits
previously provided by state sectors were either revoked or cut down. Employees in
private sectors, however, are less likely to receive welfare benefits from the state.

3.4 Industry or Non-industry
This is the measure for industrialization. The progress of industrialization has
always been associated with the expansion of welfare states (Wilensky and Lebeaux
1958, Kerr et al. 1960, Pryor 1968, Rimlinger 1971, Wilensky 1975). China’s rapid
industrialization, however, did not go with the growth of welfare expenditure. Welfare
benefits available to employees in industrial sectors did not improve in the reform era.
People in other economic sectors might have received more welfare benefits than those in
industrial sectors. Therefore, I expect that people employed in industrial sectors will
receive less welfare benefits than employees in non-industrial sectors. Hence,
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H2: A person who is employed in industrial sectors will be more likely to receive
less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than people who are employed in
non-industrial sectors.

3.5 Primary Income Source (agriculture or non-agriculture)
This is the measure for urbanization. The increase of urban population led to the
welfare state expansion in many industrialized societies. The growth of urban population and
city areas has been closely associated with a heavier welfare responsibility for the state. But in
the reform era, Chinese society has witnessed stagnant welfare expenditure during the rapid
industrialization. Therefore, each urban resident receives a decreasing share of welfare benefits.
To test the impact of urbanization on the welfare benefits, I compile employees in nonagricultural sectors to represent the urban population while those living in urban but drawing
income primarily from agricultural sectors are counted as the non-urban population. I assume
that a person drawing income primarily from non-agricultural sectors is completely urbanized. I
also assume that people employed in agricultural sectors are also economically associated with
agriculture. Their welfare benefits, therefore, are more likely disbursed from agricultural
sectors. I expect that people in non-agricultural sectors will receive less welfare benefits than
those in agricultural sectors. Hence,
H3: A person who has been economically urbanized (employed in nonagricultural sectors) is more likely to receive less welfare benefits from the state or the
work unit than people who are economically associated with agriculture (employed in
agricultural sectors and thus not completely urbanized).

3.6 Source for Welfare Benefit (state or non-state)
This is the measure for decentralization. Chinese society has been institutionally
decentralized in the reform era. The central government has given up tight control over
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many economic issues. Enterprises can retain a bigger portion of profit. Local
governments have resumed many autonomous rights in economic development. As the
result of the fiscal decentralization, the provision of the welfare benefit has accordingly
been decentralized. To test the impact of decentralization on the distribution of the
welfare benefit, I choose people who receive health care services from non-state or public
sources to represent decentralization. Drawing welfare from local funds reflects the
situation of decentralization. I expect that a person who draws from local funds receives
less welfare benefits than those people who draw from state or public sources. Hence,
H4: A person who draws from non-state or public welfare funds is more likely to
receive less welfare benefits from the state or the work unit than people who draw from
state or public welfare funds.

3.7 Control Variables
To test the institutional explanations of the distribution of welfare benefits
rigorously, I must situate these hypotheses in a more general model of the welfare benefit
distribution. Accordingly, I include a set of six additional variables as controls. Existing
research suggests that a person’s welfare benefits are shaped by many background
characteristics. I focus on certain basic background characteristics – age above 60 (60+)
and education – that shape a person’s position in welfare treatment. The expectation of
the welfare benefit discrepancy linked to age 60+ and education is based on the premise
that the older or the more educational a person is the greater welfare benefits he or she
will receive. A person’s age is at or above 60 is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. A person’s
educational level is coded by the years he or she has stayed in school.
Further, work experience is highly related to welfare benefits a person can receive.
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The premise with the variables – total years of work experience and years in current work
unit – is that the longer a person has been working for an institution the more welfare
benefits he or she will receive. Another control variable I use in the models is the gross
income a person earned in 1995. Since welfare benefits are always calculated with the
gross income as the base value, a person’s gross income will determine the welfare
benefits he or she can receive. Obviously, the more a person can earn the more welfare
benefits he or she can receive. The last control variable is the measure of the nature of job.
If one’s job is temporary, he or she will be more likely receive less welfare benefits since
seasoning or temporary jobs are automatically excluded from many welfare schemes in
China. Therefore, I expect that temporary job holders are more likely to receive less
welfare benefits than permanent job holders. A person’s job is coded as 1 if it is
temporary and 0 otherwise.

4. Analytical Methods and Models

The full model of the analysis will be the regression of the dependent variable
Welfare Benefit on the four institutional variables and all control variables. Since welfare
benefits are measured by calculating cash values paid to individuals, the natural
logarithm of the values will be more adequate. Gross income of 1995 is a control variable
which also appears in the natural logarithmic form. Hence, the full model is:
Ln(Welfare Benefit) = a + X1 Place of Work + X2 Industry or Non-Industry
+ X3 Primary Income Source + X4 Source for Welfare Benefit
+ X5 Age + X6 Education + X7 Total Years Work Experience
+ X8 Years at Current Work Unit + X9 Ln(Gross Income95)
+ X10 Temporary Job
To test the independent variable individually, I examine the dependent variable
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Welfare Benefit on each of them separately. Four institutional variables to be examined
are tested individually in each model. Therefore, model I through IV will be:
Ln(Welfare Benefit) = a + X1 (Place of Work / Industry or Non-Industry /
Primary Income Source / Source for Welfare Benefit)
+ X2 Age + X3 Education + X4 Total Years Work Experience
+ X5 Years at Current Work Unit + X6 Ln (Gross Income95)
+ X7 Temporary Job
5. Results and Analyses

In Table 5.8 I test the expectations for institutional determinants of the welfare
benefit distribution. The data are from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project urban
individual (CHIPUI) survey results. In addition to traditional factors linked to welfare
benefit, my findings confirm the strong role of institutional variables such as SOE Reform
and Decentralization in the distribution of welfare benefits. But I also find that the other
two institutional variables Industrialization and Urbanization are not statistically
significant.
Model I tests the expectation for the impacts Place of Work (state or non-state),
the equivalent for SOE reforms, has placed on the distribution of welfare benefits. Do
employees in non-state sectors receive less welfare benefits from the state or the work
unit than those people that are employed in state sectors? The results suggest that
independent variable Place of Work and the six control variables account for nearly a
quarter of the variance in the distribution of welfare benefits. Including the independent
variable, all seven explanations have significant estimates.
The independent variable Place of Work has a strong negative coefficient of 0.311
and is statistically significant. This indicates that in 1995 SOE reforms did play an
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Table 5.8 The Determinants of the Welfare Benefit Distribution
Model
II

Model
III

Model
IV

Full
Model

Expected
Direction

-

-

-.204**
(.045)

–

.003
(.042)

-

-

-022
(.041)

–

-

-

-.23
(.154)

-

-.121
(.151)

–

-

-

-

-1.22**
(.044)

-1.2**
(.045)

–

-2.2 **
(.08)
.121**
(.007)
.017**
(.003)
.01*
(.003)
.871**
(.0001)
-1.95**
(.128)
-4.1**
(.209)

-2.17**
(0.81)
.126**
(.007)
.017**
(.003)
.011**
(.003)
.971**
(.025)
-1.97**
(.129)
-4.2**
(.212)

-2.17**
(.081)
.126**
(.007)
.017**
(.003)
.011**
(.003)
.9711**
(.025)
-1.968**
(.129)
-3.97**
(.26)

-2.2**
(.078)
.104**
(.007)
.013**
(.003)
.007*
(.003)
.871**
(.025)
-1.59**
(.126)
-2.56**
(.211)

-2.22**
(.079)
.1**
(.007)
.013**
(.003)
.007*
(.003)
.863**
(.025)
-1.577**
(.126)
-2.368**
(.259)

.235

.232

.232

.276

.277

2.307

2.311

2.311

2.245

2.243

13,135

13,135

13,135

13,135

13,135

Predictors

Model I

Place of Work
(state or nonstate)

-.311 **
(.046)

Industry or Nonindustry

-

Primary Income
Source
(agriculture or
non-agriculture)
Source for
Welfare Benefit
(state or nonstate)
Control Variable
Age 60+
Education
Years of Work
Experience
Years in Current
Work Unit
Ln (Gross
Income in 1995)
Temporary Job
Constant
Model Fit
R2
Std. Error of the
Estimate
N

+
+
+
+
+
–

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients. Standardized errors are
given in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p < 0.05
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differences in ownership sector explain much of this variance. Together, measures for the
important role in the distribution of welfare benefits among urban individuals. Basically,
employees in non-state sectors received less welfare benefits from the state or the work
unit than those people who were employed in state sectors. Therefore, the argument that
SOE reforms have diminished urban employees’ welfare benefit is true. As I have
discussed in Chapter IV and previous sections in this chapter, employees in state sector
have decreased in share to merely 16 percent of total employed persons (see Figure 4.9).
About 50 percent of urban residents have lost welfare benefits of various kinds.
Employees in state sectors enjoy more welfare benefits than urban people in other
ownership sectors. The welfare benefit discrepancy between ownership sectors,
especially the state and non-state sectors, have grown rapidly as SOE reforms are widely
implemented. Welfare benefit gaps between urban residents have been widened in the
reform era.
In Model II and Model III I turn to analyzing the impacts of industrialization and
urbanization. The variable Industry or Non-industry is the equivalent for industrialization
and Primary Source of Income represents urbanization. The results suggest that the
distribution of welfare benefits has not been associated with either industrialization or
urbanization that has been consistently changing China. Contrary to my expectations,
industrialization or urbanization does not have significant estimates.
Similar to Model I findings, Model IV suggests that decentralization has a very
strong influence on the distribution of welfare benefits. In Model IV, the independent
variable Source for Welfare Benefit represents decentralization. I found that a person’s
welfare benefit decreased when he or she drew from local funds. Therefore, fiscal
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decentralization has negatively influenced those employees who draw welfare benefits
from non-state sources. This finding complies with the previous argument that
decentralization has brought financial sources to local levels and diminished welfare
benefits of those people associated with local funds.
In the Full Model, I put all four independent variables in one regression model.
All independent variables are found negatively related to the dependent variable. The
adjusted R2 (.277) and the standard error of the estimate (2.243) give us a sense of the
model’s fit. The slight improvement of the R2 in the Full Model indicates that compiling
four independent variables in one model does increase the model’s fit. Results suggest
that Place of Work and Source for Welfare Benefit are significant while Industry or Nonindustry and Primary Income Source do not have significant estimates. These results
confirm the findings from previous models. Two institutional change factors, namely
SOE reforms and decentralization, have been tested significantly influencing Chinese
urban people’s well-being.
The results of the Full Model indicate that individuals working for non-state
sectors receive less welfare benefits than employees in the state sector. This is what
hypothesis number one (H1) articulates. Hence, laid-off workers during SOE reforms are
the losers in terms of welfare benefits. Since hundreds of thousands of workers were laid
off during the SOE reforms, the overall welfare provision for the urban population has
correspondingly decreased in quality.
Urban individuals drawing welfare benefits from local funds are found receiving
less welfare support than people receiving welfare benefits from the state or central funds.
Therefore, hypothesis number four (H4) is true. In the reform era, an important strategy
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adopted by the Chinese government was the stimulation of local incentive. Local
governments and enterprises were encouraged to achieve fiscal independence and selfsustain. As a result, welfare funds previously controlled by the central government were
decentralized during the market reforms. The proportion of urban people receiving
welfare benefits from local funds increased while individuals drawing from state or
central welfare funds decreased correspondingly (see Figure 4.9). Hence, urban people’s
welfare benefits were diminished due to the decentralization.
The two non-significant variables are Industry or Non-industry and Primary
Income Source which represent industrialization and urbanization respectively.
Hypotheses number two (H2) and three (H3) are thus not supported by neither the
individual testing model nor the Full Model. These results strongly signal that
industrialization and urbanization are not determinant factors for the welfare benefit
discrepancy found among Chinese urban individuals.
Although in the Full Model these two variables representing industrialization and
urbanization still share with Place of Work and Source for Welfare Benefit the negative
direction of impact towards the dependent variable, their estimates are not significant. I
can only guess without any concrete support that urban people who work for nonindustrial sectors or who draw primary income from agricultural sectors (farming, fishing,
etc.) might be placed in the disadvantageous situation in terms of welfare benefit.

6. Conclusion

This chapter discusses the distribution of welfare benefits in rural and urban areas.
Through the exploration of the data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP)
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1988 and 1995, I found that institutional changes did influence the chance and amount
people receive welfare benefits from the state or the work unit. Rural people were the
primary victims of the economic reforms. In the pre-reform era, more than 90 percent of
the rural population was covered by some kind of medical insurance that was financed by
collective funds. Economic reforms dismantled the organizational and fiscal sources for
rural welfare schemes. By the early 1990s, less than ten percent of the rural population
was covered by a medical insurance. The measure of 1988 CHIP suggests that 98 percent
of the rural households received nothing from collective welfare funds. Some poorest
households, for example the five-guarantees households which were the primary targets
of the social relief in the pre-reform era, were completely ignored by the government.
Obviously, welfare provision in Chinese countryside was shrinking in coverage and
quality.
The welfare provision for urban residents was diversified. On one hand,
employees in the state sector still enjoyed full welfare coverage. State or publicly funded
welfare schemes provided various kinds of welfare benefits to employees in the state
sector. On the other hand, non-state employees lost welfare privileges they enjoyed in the
pre-reform era. Evidences from multiple regressions suggest that SOE reforms and the
decentralization played a significant role in the welfare benefit downsizing in the reform
era. They both negatively influenced the distribution of welfare benefits. Basically,
employees in non-state sectors and drawing welfare benefits from local funds are more
likely to receive less welfare benefits from the work unit. The other two institutional
changes, industrialization and urbanization, are found not statistically significant.
These findings confirmed the conclusion made in Chapter IV. The Chinese
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welfare state still biases again rural people. Employees in the state sector receive more
welfare benefits than people in other ownership sectors. Institutional decentralization
enables local governments and enterprises to possess relatively bigger share of resources
and more autonomous rights in the economic field. However, few resources have been
used to promote people’s well-being. Therefore, people associated with local welfare
funds are found worse off in the reform era. Industrialization and urbanization have nonsignificant estimates in the regression. Descriptive analyses indication that quite contrary
to what happened in Western industrial societies, the Chinese industrialization and
urbanization did not bring more welfare to the people. This is not surprised since the
economistic state orientation determines that the Chinese government regards economic
development as its highest goal. The cost, therefore, is people’s well-being.
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

China is undertaking a major revamping of its social security and welfare system.
Reforms of its social policies are at the crossroads and many challenges are to be seen.
The multiple transitions since the early 1980s have dismantled a system of enterprise
welfare (welfare distributed primarily by work units). A new welfare system based on
market is replacing the old work unit-based welfare system under the planned economy.
China is the most populous country with a large rural population. Its newly established
market economy is still weak and the gaps between regions are widening. These
demographic and economic factors determine that the Chinese government will not
resolve the welfare benefit discrepancy in the foreseeable future.
This dissertation has two interlinked purposes: to describe and discuss China’s
multiple transitions and the institutional performance, and to examine empirically how
these transitions have influenced the Chinese social security and welfare system and
people’s well being. This dissertation has deliberately discussed the development of the
Chinese welfare state since the establishment of the Communist regime. It demonstrates
the differences between the welfare provision in ancient China and the modern welfare
schemes created and maintained by the Communist government. The CCP laid down the
ground for the modern welfare state in the early years of the PRC. Comprehensive and
generous welfare schemes covering almost every aspect of people’s welfare needs were
installed as early as in 1951. In the pre-reform era, the Chinese government provided fullfledged welfare schemes to the majority of urban residents. Rural people were also
covered by some welfare programs funded by collectives or the local government. The
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Chinese government adopted a “low wage high welfare benefit” policy in its socialist
construction and consolidation period (Chow 1987, Chen 2003). This policy encouraged
full employment and as a result led China to an egalitarian society (Chan and Chow
1992).
Economic reforms initiated in the early 1980s, however, have dramatically
changed the Chinese welfare state. Many welfare schemes originally financed by the
government’s general revenue or the enterprise profit were revoked or cut back. The
government began to promote economic growth at the cost of people’s job security and
welfare benefit. China’s fiscal system was decentralized. Local governments and
enterprises were given more autonomy in deciding economic issues. As a result, centrally
financed welfare schemes were gradually moved to local levels. In the reform era, the
near-universal coverage which is thought to have been an important reason for China’s
spectacular success in improving health outcomes during the 1970s has since been in dim
condition (Sidel 1993).
In urban areas, hundreds of thousands of state employees were laid off due to the
enterprise reforms which established the promotion of productivity the highest goal.
Welfare benefits these former state employees enjoyed were either cancelled or moved to
institutions at local levels where financial resources are scarce. Only in recent years, new
welfare schemes were installed to protect low-income urban residents. For example, the
Minimum Living Standard security system (MLS) was enforced to give welfare relief to
the poorest urbanities who were always jobless. In rural areas, people could no longer
draw welfare benefits from collective funds since the collapse of the people’s communes.
The old Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (RCMS) was almost completely disappeared
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in rural areas. Although the government adopted a plan in 2003 to establish a new RCMS
in some affluent rural areas, the achievement was undecided.
This dissertation introduces an institutional approach for the research of the
Chinese welfare state and the measure of the Chinese people’s welfare benefit. Earlier
research suggests that China’s economic reforms have influenced social and welfare
policies and consequentially people’s well-being (Wong 1992, 1998, Chen 2002). This
dissertation demonstrates that multiple institutional transitions due to the economic
reforms initiated in the early 1980s have since dramatically changed the Chinese welfare
state and the way welfare benefits are distributed.
Multiple institutional transitions discussed in this dissertation are structural
changes associated with the SOE reforms, the rapid industrialization, ever-growing
urbanization, and large-scale decentralization of the fiscal system since the early 1980s.
These institutional transitions have influenced the Chinese welfare state and people’s
well-being in different ways. Descriptive analyses in Chapter IV and Chapter V revealed
that institutional transitions have by and large led China into a more polarized society.
Basically, employees in the state sector are still covered by social security and welfare
schemes of various kinds. Those SOE laid-off workers and urban individuals in non-state
sectors, however, are less lucky. They were either completely removed from publicly
funded welfare schemes or given only limited access to some minor relief programs.
China’s industrialization did not show a linear growth in its progress. It had been
discontinuous until the market reforms were initiated in the early 1980s (see Figure 4.12).
The growth of the industrial output and industrial workforce has since increased
consistently, which eventually placed more pressure on the Chinese government. In
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contrast to the general connection between economic prosperity and growing welfare
spending, China’ ever-growing modernization towards an industrial society since the
1980s did not led to the growth of social security and welfare expenditure.
The exploration of China’s statistical data gives us one more interesting finding:
When Chinese society became more urbanized over time, the government did not
increase its welfare spending proportionally. In the reform era, the central government’s
welfare expenditure remained stagnant at approximately two percent of its total
expenditure (see Table 4.2) whereas the rate for industrialization and urbanization were
consistently growing (see Figure 4.12 & 4.17).
The decentralization of China’s fiscal system and economic institutions further
polarized the Chinese welfare system. A series of fiscal decentralization measures
adopted by the Chinese government in the early 1980s have since decreased the revenue
share of the center significantly.
In order to test the impacts these institutional variables have placed on the
distribution of welfare benefits, I designed five multiple regression models using the data
from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project Urban Individual data (CHIPUI). The
collection for urban individuals which includes 21,698 cases was used for the regression
models. After removing invalid and missing values, 13,135 cases were actually reported
in the regression models. The findings confirmed that two institutional changes – SOE
reforms and decentralization – played significant roles in the welfare benefit distribution
among urban individuals. The other two institutional changes, namely industrialization
and urbanization, did not have significant estimates. All four variables had negative
relations towards the welfare benefits received by Chinese urban individuals. Results
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suggest that SOE reforms and the decentralization of the Chinese fiscal system have
diminished urban people’s welfare benefits in the reform era.
The regression results indicate that China’s multiple transitions since the early
1980s have radically changed the Chinese welfare state and the way people receiving
welfare benefits. The market reforms have brought visible institutional changes into
Chinese society. The centrally planned economy has gradually been replaced by a market
economy. As a result, the Chinese polity has become more fragmented. Local
governments received more autonomy in economic development. The emergence of a
civil society enabled ordinary people to gain more freedom as well as to shoulder more
responsibility, particular the self-sustaining obligation.
The radical fluctuation of the welfare expenditure has been results of political
leaders’ conscious policy choices. As discussed in Chapter II, the Chinese government
played an active role in the development of the welfare system. The creation of a fullfledged welfare system in the very early years of the PRC was a conscious choice of the
Chinese leadership at that time. In the early 1950s, the newly establish Communist
regime relied primarily on the support of the working class. The CCP was very aware of
threats from the internal and external enemies. Therefore, the government financed a
comprehensive welfare system in order to build a coalition of the proletarian to fight
against the overthrown capitalists and feudal landlords.
In the reform era, the Chinese leadership began to focus its attention on economic
growth and the improvement of living standard. The obvious reason for rural reforms, for
example, was to seek the security of food production which was severely undermined by
the extreme leftist line in the Great Cultural Revolution (Oi 1996, 1999, Yao 1999). The
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introduction of the market mechanisms in China’s rural economy was also a conscious
choice of the political leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping. In the early 1980s, Deng
urged his party to abandon the planned economic system. He emphasized that a planned
economy is not the definition of socialism (Gittings 2005). Deng stressed the primacy of
agricultural output and encouraged a significant decentralization of decision making in
the rural economy teams and individual peasant households. The creation of the
Household Productive Responsibility System (HPRS) was one of Deng’s conscious
policy choices towards the rural economic reforms which thereafter depleted collective
welfare funds and rendered the collapse of the RCMS.
Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, China’s substantial economic growth
rocketed. Throughout the 1990s, the CCP considered the well-executed reforms of SOEs
as the top national priority and of vital importance in building a health socialist market
economy. By 1997 the Chinese government enforced its policy of zhua da fang xiao
(seizing the bigs and releasing the smalls) as the means to reform the SOEs. A
shareholding system was claimed to be the reform’s major policy tool. As a result of this
policy choice, hundreds of millions of SOE employees were laid off and denied of access
to state-funded welfare schemes.
The Hu Jintao administration, however, altered the route on the social policy to
achieve a harmonious society. In recent speech President Hu announced that the
country’s new political goal was to construct a harmonious society (People’s Daily Oct.
20 2006). Former Premier Zhu Rongji, in office in 1998-2003, expressed to media in
2000 that the building of a comprehensive social security system is a crucial issue for
China’s reform, development and stability (People’s Daily Dec. 14, 2000). In his 2007
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government work report, current Premier Wen Jiabao pledges that the government will
promote a new rural cooperative medical sytem (RCMS). The new generation of Chinese
leaders wants to construct a harmonious society. With this in mind, the government has
made the restoration of a variety of social security programs and welfare schemes a
priority on its agenda and budget plans.
The Chinese government has recently taken efforts to improve its shabby welfare
system. With the implementation of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, China’s labor and social
security buildup was announced entering a new phase of development. During the early
stage of the twenty-first century, these efforts face both pressures from fiscal constrains
and continuous market reforms. Obviously, the overall progress of the reforms and the
opening-up and modernization drive have created favorable conditions for solving the
problems of employment and social security. The further growth of the national economy
and the increase of productivity will provide a firm material foundation for the
improvement of people’s well-being.
Ever since the market-oriented employment mechanism was installed, the Chinese
social security and welfare system has been facing both opportunities and challenges. On
one hand, the market reforms and rapid economic growth have laid a sound ground for
further promotion of the social security and welfare system. On the other hand, the
Chinese government shall be prepared that the social security problem in both the rural
and urban areas will remain sharp, and structural unemployment will become more
serious for a long period.
Despite marked progress in recent years, the social security and welfare system in
China is still confronted with many challenges. For example, extension of coverage
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remains a major task for various social insurance schemes. Social relief programs need to
be further improved to provide protection for disadvantaged people. The upgrading of the
Chinese economy threw heavy demand on structural changes. Millions of workers are
expected to be retrenched due to foreign competition and industry upgrading pressure. In
the long run, China has to resolve a series of social and economic issues brought about by
the rapid aging of its vast population.
Policies and measures for the Chinese government to conduct in the near future
are various. First, the government is demanded to carry out an active policy for
promoting employment. Therefore, tertiary industry, small and medium businesses, and
non-state sectors shall be taken as the main channels for employment. Second, the central
government shall promote reforms on the wage and income distribution system. The
minimum wage system as well as the “equal pay for equal work” principle shall be
upheld and improved to cover the majority of urban population and permanent peasant
workers. Efforts shall be made to continue the pilot programs for the collective wage
consultation system which were recently put into practice in a few coastal cities. Third,
China has made a very good start in laying the foundation for a more stable old-age
pension system. The new pension program shall include multiple pillars. Current pension
programs do not encourage individual savings and the gap between different ownership
sectors are growing. The financing burden of social security programs shall be borne by
the individual, the work unit, and the government. A reasonable share of burden is to be
worked out.
The substantial changes of the Chinese social security and welfare system suggest
that the underlying driving force for social policy reforms has been the broader effort to
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stimulate economic growth and efficiency. The economistic state orientation has led the
Chinese leaders to pursue economic growth at the cost of people’s welfare. The
government has noted the unexpected impacts due to the absence of a sound social
security and welfare system. Recently, it has taken a bigger and more direct role in social
benefit provision. The government also takes the responsibility of providing a safety net
for the urban poor through public assistance and relief programs. But the widening
income gap between social groups, the foreseeable large-scale unemployment, and the
absence of a democratic system will rather render a more polarized society. In recent
years, the number of protest events involving large amount of peasants and peasant
workers has been growing at a surprising rate. This is a very strong sign of social
inequality. If the government fails to rebuild a sound welfare system extending its
coverage to more disadvantaged population, the future of Chinese society will be rather
dim.
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Timelines of China’s Welfare Program Reforms Since 1980
Program
Social
security

Year of
Rural areas
reform
Old-age pension: the 1984
1. Five guarantees: oldreform was introduced
aged or disabled with
in 1984. In 1997, a
no close relative to rely
formal Decision on
on can receive monthly
Establishing a Uniform
or annual payment
Basic
Old-Age
from the government or
Insurance System for
the village community.
Enterprise Employees
2.
Retired
cadres:
was promulgated.
depending on the rank,
a retired cadre can
receive various pension
payments or subsidies.
Unemployment
1986
Social insurance for
insurance:
the
peasant at developed
government set up an
areas
such
as
unemployment
Guangdong
and
insurance system in
Shanghai.
1986 to assist the rapid
reforms in state-owned
enterprises. In 1999,
the
government
adopted
the
Regulations
on
Unemployment
Insurance.

Urban areas

Medical insurance: the 1988
reform was initiated in
1988 in response to the
unfitted free medicare
system. In 1998, the
government issued the
Decision
on
Establishing the Basic
Medical
Insurance
System for Urban
Emeployees.
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Year
of
reform
Early
1980s

1987

Rural
Cooperative 2006
Medical System

Program

Year of
Rural areas
reform
Industrial
injury Late
insurance:
the 1980
government
first
introduced a set of
reforms
on
this
program in the late
1980s. In 1996, the
Trial Procedures for
Industrial
Injury
Insurance
for
Enterprise Employees
was issued.

Urban areas

Year
of
reform

Child birth insurance: 1988
the reform was first
made
in
some
enterprises in 1988.
The Trial Procedures
for
Childbirth
Insurance
for
Enterprise Employees
was formally issued in
1994
Two guarantees
three
lines
protections
Social
welfare
and relief

and 1998
of

Two guarantees and 1998
three
lines
of
protection: a policy
ensures that laid-offs
from SOEs can receive
basic living allowances.
Minimum
living 1999
standard
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Relief for “hardship” 1987
household

Minimum
standard

living 2006
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